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1IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
V. 
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2016-6339 
Docket No. 44886 
______________ ) 
Michael A. Kirkham 
375 D. Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83401 
Attorney for Appellant 
************** 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
************** 
Appeal from the District Court of the 
Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Bonneville 
HONORABLE JOEL E. TINGEY, District Judge. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
B.J. Driscoll 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Attorney for Respondent 
2Date: 5/2/2017 
Time: 03:43 PM 
Page 1 of 2 
Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2016-0006339-OC Current Judge: Joel E. Tingey 
City of Idaho Falls, Idaho, vs. H-K Contractors, Inc. , an Idaho Corporation 
User: ABIRCH 
City of Idaho Falls, Idaho, vs. H-K Contractors, Inc., an Idaho Corporation 
Date Code User Judge 
11/22/2016 SMIS TCORONA Summons Issued Joel E. Tingey 
NCOC TCORONA New Case Filed-Other Claims Joel E. Tingey 
NOAP TCORONA Plaintiff: City of Idaho Falls, Idaho, Notice Of Joel E. Tingey 
Appearance Randall D. Fife 
TCORONA Filing: AA- All initial civil case filings in District Joel E. Tingey 
Court of any type not listed in categories E, F and 
H(1) Paid by: Fife, Randall D. (attorney for City 
of Idaho Falls, Idaho,) Receipt number: 0049830 
Dated: 11/22/2016 Amount: $221 .00 (Check) 
For: City of Idaho Falls, Idaho, (plaintiff) 
COMP TCORONA Verified Complaint Filed Joel E. Tingey 
11/23/2016 COMP CEARLY First Amended Verified Complaint Filed Joel E. Tingey 
11/30/2016 HRSC SOUTHWIC Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/04/2017 08:30 Joel E. Tingey 
AM) Driscoll - motion dismiss 
12/19/2016 MOTN BJENNINGS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Joel E. Tingey 
BRIF BJENNINGS Brief In Support of Motion to Dismiss Joel E. Tingey 
NOTH BJENNINGS Notice Of Hearing - Motion to Dismiss - Joel E. Tingey 
01/04/2017 at 8:30 AM 
12/28/2016 BRIF CPETERSON Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Joel E. Tingey 
Dismiss 
1/3/2017 BRIF JNICHOLS Defendant's Reply Brief In Support Of Motion To Joel E. Tingey 
Dismiss 
JNICHOLS Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Joel E. Tingey 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Driscoll 
Law, P.C. Receipt number: 0002960 Dated: 
1/4/2017 Amount: $136.00 (Check) For: H-K 
Contractors, Inc., an Idaho Corporation 
(defendant) 
1/4/201 7 DCHH SOUTHWIC Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Joel E. Tingey 
01/04/2017 08:30 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Jack fuller 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Driscoll - motion dismiss - under 100 
MINE SOUTHWIC Minute Entry Joel E. Tingey 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 1/4/201 7 
Time: 8:30 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Jack Fuller 
Minutes Clerk: Marlene Southwick 
Tape Number: 3 
Party: City of Idaho Falls, Idaho,, Attorney: 
Randall Fife 
Party: H-K Contractors, Inc., an Idaho Corporation 
NOAP JNICHOLS Defendant: H-K Contractors, Inc. , an Idaho Joel E. Tingey 
Corporation Notice Of Appearance B.J. Driscoll 
3Date: 5/2/201 7 
Time: 03:43 PM 
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Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2016-0006339-OC Current Judge: Joel E. Tingey 
User: ABIRCH 
City of Idaho Falls, Idaho, vs. H-K Contractors, Inc., an Idaho Corporation 
City of Idaho Falls, Idaho, vs . H-K Contractors, Inc., an Idaho Corporation 
Date 
1/19/2017 
2/2/2017 
2/16/2017 
2/23/2017 
2/28/2017 
3/20/2017 
3/28/201 7 
4/24/2017 
Code 
DEOP 
JDMT 
STATUS 
CDIS 
MEMO 
AFFD 
BNDC 
STATUS 
BNDC 
NOTC 
APSC 
ORDR 
JDMT 
CDIS 
CERTAP 
APSC 
NOTC 
NOTC 
BNDC 
BNDE 
User 
SOUTHWIC 
SOUTHWIC 
SOUTHWIC 
SOUTHWIC 
TCORONA 
TCORONA 
TCORONA 
TCORONA 
TCORONA 
TCORONA 
TCORONA 
TCORONA 
SOUTHWIC 
SOUTHWIC 
SOUTHWIC 
ABIRCH 
ABIRCH 
TCORONA 
BJENNINGS 
HORNE 
HORNE 
ALINARES 
Judge 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Joel E. Tingey 
Motion to Dismiss 
Judgment -- complaint in this matter is dismissed Joel E. Tingey 
with prejudice 
Case Status Changed: Closed Joel E. Tingey 
Civil Disposition entered for: H-K Contractors, 
Inc., an Idaho Corporation, Defendant; City of 
Idaho Falls, Idaho,, Plaintiff. Filing date: 
1/19/2017 
Memorandum Of Attorney's Fees And Costs 
Affidavit Of B.J. Driscoll In Support Of Motion For 
Award Of Attorney's Fees And Costs 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 9364 Dated 
2/16/2017 for 100.00) 
Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk 
action 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 9366 Dated 
2/16/2017 for 200.00) 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Filing: L4 - Appeal , Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Joel E. Tingey 
Supreme Court Paid by: Fife, Randall D. 
(attorney for City of Idaho Falls, Idaho,) Receipt 
number: 0009367 Dated: 2/16/2017 Amount: 
$129.00 (Check) For: City of Idaho Falls, Idaho, 
(plaintiff) 
Notice Of Appeal 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Order 
Judgment of Costs -- Def is awarded costs 
against Pl in the amt of $136.00 with interest 
Civil Disposition entered for: H-K Contractors, 
Inc., an Idaho Corporation, Defendant; City of 
Idaho Falls, Idaho,, Plaintiff. Filing date: 
2/23/2017 
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Amended Notice Of Appeal 
Second Amended Notice of Appeal 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 15142 Dated 
3/28/2017 for 81 .25) for transcript 
Cash Bond Exonerated (Amount 81 .25) 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Joel E. Tingey 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
Meuleman Law Group, PLLC Receipt number: 
0019471 Dated: 4/24/2017 Amount: $13.00 
(Check) 
4,. ,, .... '/ILLE COUN i Y. IOMi 
Randall D. Fife/ISB # 4010 
Michael A. Kirkham/ISB #8939 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS 
375 D. Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83401 
Telephone: (208) 612-8178 
Facsimile: (208) 612-8175 
Attorney for City of Idaho Falls, Idaho 
211s tmv 22 PM 3: OG 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS, an Idaho ) 
municipal corporation, ) Case No. C}J ~ { (..p ./(/3~ 
) 
Plaintiff, ) VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
) 
vs. ) Fee: $221.00 
) 
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
---------- ----- ) 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, the City of Idaho Falls, Idaho, a municipal corporation of the State 
ofldaho (the "City ofldaho Falls"), by and through its counsel ofrecord and as and for a claim against 
Defendant, complains and alleges as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff, is an Idaho municipal corporation of the state of Idaho, duly and legally 
organized and created pursuant to, and by vi1tue of, the laws of the state ofldaho. 
2. Defendant is an Idaho Corporation, duly and legally organized and created pursuant 
to, and by virtue of, the laws of the state ofldaho. 
3. Plaintiff, by this action, seeks to enforce a written Storm Drainage Agreement, 
VERIFIED COMPLAJNT PAGE I OF4 
5attached hereto as Exhibit " 1," between the patties that was executed on September 23, 2005. 
4. The above-entitled court has jurisdiction and venue over this action. 
COUNT] 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
5. On or about September 1, 2005, Brent Foster, President of the Defendant and acting on 
behalf of Defendant, delivered a signed and notarized Stom1 Drainage Agreement to Plaintiff. 
6. On or about September 22, 2005 City of Idaho Falls, Idaho, City Council approved and 
directed the execution of the Storm Drainage Agreement. 
7. Pmsuant to the terms of the Storm Drainage Agreement, Defendant agreed to convey 
to Plaintiff a gravel pit legally described a : 
Beginning at a point which bears S0209'51 "E953.65 feet along the section line from 
the West One-Quaiter Comer of Section 33, Township 2 North Range 38 East, 
B.M. , the following boundary rmming along the boundaries described in the 
following Instnunent records; 425775, 964183, 652363, 877670, 432059 an.d 
1061244: Running thence S89° 18'30"E 350.87 feet; thence N02°09'50"W 346.65 
feet; thence S88°43' 17"E968.88 feet; thence NO2'09'50"W 602.50 feet to the no1th 
boundary of the HK Pit· thence S88°40'44"E. 1381.92 feet; thence S0056'59"E. 
1321.50 feet to the South boundary of the HK Pit; thence 8914'58"W 2321.53 feet 
along the said South Boundary· th nee N02°09'50"W, 365.85 feet; thence . 89° 
15'03" W 350.86 feet to the West line of Section 33; thence N02°09'51 ''W 30.00 
feet to the point of beginning. Containing 58.31 acres, more or less. 
8. Pursuant to the tem1s of the St01111 Drainage Agreement, Defendant was to convey the 
gravel pit to Plaintiff no later than March 1, 2010. 
9. Defendant did not convey the gravel pit to Plaintiff on or befor March 1 2010. 
10. Plaintiff requested, in writing, that Defendant convey the gravel pit on March 9 2016, 
xhibit 2.'' 
11. Defendant has refused to con ey the gravel pit to Plaintiff upon Plaintiff's request, despite 
having a contractual obligation to convey th gravel pit, Exhibit "3. ' 
VERTFIED COMPLAJNT PAGE 2 OF 4 
612. To date, Plaintif-fs governing board, the Idaho Falls City Council, has not released 
Defendant from its obligation nor directed any of its agents to release Defendant from its obligation. 
COUNT 2 
WASTE 
13. PJaintiff realleges and incorporates herein the allegations set folih in paragraphs 1 tlu·ough 
12, above. 
14. Defendant continues to occupy the gravel pit and mines and removes gravel and earth 
from the gravel pit, causing permanent and lasting injury to the gravel pit and Plaintiff. 
15. Defendant's title to the gravel pit is lin1ited by Plaintiff's interest in the prope1ty from 
March 1, 20 IO and onwards. 
16. Plaintiff is entitled to the profits fro m Defendant's mining of the gravel pit from March 1, 
2010, and onwards. 
17. Plaintiff is entitled to damages resulting from Defendant's conti nuing mining, which has 
resulted in pennanent and lasting injury to the gravel pit. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, the City of Idaho Falls, Idaho, prays for j udgment against the Defendant(s) 
as follows: 
A. Declaring that Defendant breached the Stonn Drainage Agreement and the award of 
damages to Plaintiff for injuries sustained from Defendant' s breach, in an an1ount to be proved at 
trial; 
B. Awarding Plaintiff specific performance of the St01m Drainage Agreement, specifically 
that Defendant convey the gravel pit to Plaintiff, including all in1provements made to the property; 
C. Awarding Plaintiff damages for waste, in an amow1t to be determined at trial; 
VERIFIED COMPLJ\lNT PAGE 3 0F4 
7D. Awarding Plaintiff the profits from Defendant's continued mining of the property; 
E. Awarding attorney' s fees and costs to Plaintiff; and 
F. For all other and further relief, in law and equity, to which Plaintiff may be entitled. 
DATED tliis-Z2,J'day of November, 2016. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
Chris Fredericksen, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he is the Public Works Director of the City ofldaho Falls, Idaho, Plaintiff herein, that he 
has read the foregoing document, knows the contents thereof, and believes the same to be true and 
correct to the best ofrus information, knowledge and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me trus l, L- day ofNovember, 2016. 
\\\\\II llyll I I/ 11111 )\,,, x.~L L L £-"11,. 
~~fo ••••• •·• ,-Ph~~ g-~ .. ·· ···./u'~ 
~ ~ ~ ~ f :" ~OTAR}' • •• 1 
- . . -
= • . = 
- . . -= . . : 
- . . -
- . . -~ \ PUBLlC / ~ 
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~ ... ... ~ ~ ~ ••••••• .. ~ ~'lti;. ;,11, ~l'f OF fil~~,,,,._ 
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VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
Not_ . Public forldah \l . ~  
Res1 mg atQffi\;UJ/1 U.. ~ 
C01mnission expires: \ 0 I i \ l 1: 
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Randall D. Fife/ISB # 4010 
Michael A. Kirk.ham/ISB #8939 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS 
375 D. Street 2n1s ! 23 AH s: s2 
Idaho Falls, ID 83401 
Telephone: (208) 612-8178 
Facsimile: (208) 612-8175 
Attorney for City of Idaho Falls, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS, an Idaho ) 
municipal corporation, ) Case No. CV-2016-6339 
) 
Plaintiff, ) FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED 
) COMPLAINT 
vs. ) 
) 
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC. , an Tdaho ) 
Corporation, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
_______ _ _ _ _____ ) 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, the City of Idaho Falls, Idaho, a municipal corporation of the State 
ofldaho (the "City ofldaho Falls"), by and through its counsel of record and as and for a claim against 
Defendant, complains and alleges as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff, is an Idaho municipal corporation of the state ofldaho, duly and legally 
organized and created pursuant to, and by virtue of, the laws of the state ofldaho. 
2. Defendant is an Idaho Corporation, duly and legally organized and created pursuant 
to, and by vittue of, the laws of the state ofldal10. 
3. Plaintiff, by this action, seeks to enforce a written Storm Drainage Agreement, 
attached hereto as Exhibit "1," between the parties that was executed on September 23, 2005. 
FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT PAGE l OF 4 
94. The above-entitled court has jmisdiction and venue over this action. 
COUNTl 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
5. On or about September 1, 2005, Brent Foster, President of the Defendant and acting on 
behalf of Defendant, delivered a signed and notarized Storm Drainage Agreement to Plaintiff. 
6. On or about September 22, 2005, City of Idaho Falls, Idaho, City Council approved and 
directed the execution of the St01m Drainage Agreement. 
7. Pursuant to the te1ms of the Storm Drainage Agreement, Defendant agreed to convey 
to Plaintiff a gravel pit legally described as: 
Beginning at a point which bears S0209'51 "E953.65 feet along the section line from 
the West One-Quarter Comer of Section 33, Township 2 North, Range 38 East, 
B.M., the following boundary running along the boundaries described in the 
following Instnunent records; 425775, 964183, 652363, 877670, 432059 and 
1061244: Running thence S89° 18'30"E 350.87 feet; thence N02°09'50"W 346.65 
feet; thence S88°43' l 7"E968.88 feet; thence NO2'09'50"W 602.50 feet to the no1ih 
boundary of the HK Pit; thence S88°40'44"E. 1381.92 feet; thence S0056'59"E. 
1321.50 feet to the South boundary of the HK Pit; thence N8914'58"W 2321.53 feet 
along the said South Boundary; thence N02°09'50"W, 365.85 feet; thence N89° 
15'03" W 350.86 feet to the West line of Section 33; thence N02°09'51 "W 30.00 
feet to the point of beginning. Containing 58.31 acres, more or less. 
8. Pursuant to the terms of the Storm Drainage Agreement, Defendant was to convey the 
gravel pit to Plaintiff no later than March 1, 2010. 
9. Defendant did not convey the gravel pit to Plaintiff on or before March 1, 2010. 
10. Plaintiff requested, in writing, that Defendant convey the gravel pit on March 9, 2016, 
Exhibit "2." 
11. Defendant has refused to convey the gravel pit to Plaintiff upon Plaintiffs request, despite 
having a contractual obligation to convey the gravel pit, Exhibit "3." 
12. To date, Plaintiffs governing board, the Idaho Falls City Council, has not released 
Defendant from its obligation nor directed any of its agents to release Defendant from its obligation. 
FlRST AMENDED VERIFfED COMPLAINT PAGE20F4 
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COUNT2 
WASTE 
13. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 
12, above. 
14. Defendant continues to occupy the gravel pit and mines and removes gravel and earth 
from the gravel pit, causing pem1anent and lasting injury to the gravel pit and Plaintiff. 
15. Defendant's title to the gravel pit is limited by Plaintiffs interest in the property from 
March 1, 2010 and onwards. 
16. Plaintiff is entitled to the profits from Defendant's mining of the gravel pit from March 1, 
2010, and onwards. 
17. Plaintiff is entitled to damages resulting from Defendant's continuing mining, which has 
resulted in pe1manent and lasting injury to the gravel pit. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, the City ofldaho Falls, Idaho, prays for judgment against the Defendant(s) 
as follows: 
A. Declaring that Defendant breached the Storm Drainage Agreement and the award of 
damages to Plaintiff for injuries sustained from Defendant's breach, in an amount to be proved at 
trial; 
B. Awarding Plaintiff specific performance of the St01m Drainage Agreement, specifically 
that Defendant convey the gravel pit to Plaintiff, including all improvements made to the property; 
C. Awarding Plaintiff damages for waste, in an amount to be determined at trial; 
D. Awarding Plaintiff the profits from Defendant's continued mining of the property; 
E. Awarding attorney's fees and costs to Plaintiff; and 
F. For all other and further relief, in Jaw and equity, to which Plaintiff may be entitled. 
FTRST AMENDED VERlflED COMPLAJNT PAGE30F4 
11
DATED thisZZtt~ay ofNovember, 2016. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
Chris Fredericksen, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he is the Public Works Director of the City ofldaho Falls, Idaho, Plaintiff herein, that he 
has read the foregoing document, knows the contents thereof, and believes the same to be true and 
con-ect to the best of his information, knowledge and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this i~ day ofNovember, 2016. 
FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
Notary Public fordaho . Q 
Residing afJ?1fvWLtV\ \A.b, ~ 
Commission expires: 1-i I i- 1 \ 7 
PAGE 4 OF4 
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Exhibit 1 
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( .R~-Recorded to Corr( . Proper Attachment Bo?~ 
1201021 
/ b.:l~~El;~ILLE (CJUNJY t~E(J){I~R 
~i z~=r4tJl1:3 }:il_. ! t::.ttG~ r=fi .j ~1'/ 
STORM DRAINAGE AGREEMENT 
~-
AGREEMJ~NT, made this:Z-3\'Zlt day of JuJy, 2005, by and between HK 
Contractors, Inc., an Idaho corporation; hereinafter refen'ed to as "H.K.'; and the City of 
Idaho falls, a municipal corporation, P.O. Box 50220, Idaho Falls, Idaho, 83405, 
hereinafter tefen-ed to as "CITY". 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, HK currently owns a parcel of real prope1ty, located approximately 
one and one-quarter (1.25) miles south of Simnyside Road and imtnediately east of St. 
Clair Road, which property is more particularly d~scribcd in Exhibit "A'' attached hereto 
aµd by this reference made a part hereof (hereinafter refoned to as the "HK Property"); 
WHEREAS, HK is currently using the HK Property for the purpose of mining and 
extractmg gravel and conducting a gravel crushing operation thereupon; 
WHEREAS, the City owns and operates the Kensington Park storm drainage pond 
prope1ty located_ approximately three-quartets (3/4) of a n:iile north of the HK property; 
WHEREAS, the City needs to acquire additional property for the purpose of 
storing storm drainage waters flowing from the Kensington Park pond; 
WHEREAS, HK is willing to allow the City to make use of the HK property for 
such purposes; 
WHEREAS, the City will need to construct certi'clin storm drainage lines 
connecting the Kensington Park storm dr_ainage pond_ to the HK property'; in reliance upon 
the terms, conditions and cov~nants of this Agreement; 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby agreed as follows: 
1. Grant of Storm Drainage Easem~nt. In consideration for the paym:ent by 
the City of one dollar ($1) and other good and valuable consideration_, and in 
consideration of the City's reliance Upon the tenns and conditions hereof, HK agrees to 
forthwith execute and deliver to the City a Storm Drainage Easem,~nt over and &Cross 
ce1tl;l.in real property owned by HK, said storm drainage easement to b~ in the form of 
Exhibit "B'; attached hereto. 
2, Conveyance of Fee Title. Sub}ect to the time fram(;)s set f01th below, HK 
further agrees to convey to the City, by grant deed in the form attached hereto as Exhibit 
''C1', fee titfe to the HK Property. Such conveyance shall be made at such time as HK 
14
concludes its gravel mining and crushing operation at the HK Property, as may be 
determined by HK in its sole discretion, but in no event later than March 1, 2010. I IK 
agrees that it will not permit the HK Property to be contaminated with any hazardous 
substance, as such term is defined under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA" 42 U.S.C. § 9601, et seq), as 
antended, the Idaho Environmental Protection and Health Act of 1972 ("IEPHA," Title 
39, Chapter l, Id~ho Code), the Idaho Hazardous Waste Management Act of 1983 
("IHWMA," Title 39, Chapter 44, Idaho Code) or any other similar state or federal law or 
regulation regulating the use, storage, transport or ma,nufacture of a hazatdot1s substance. 
3. Bip.ding Effect. 'fhis agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the 
benefit of the heirs, personal representatives, administrators, successors and assigns of the 
parties hereto. 
4. Complete Agreement. This writing evidences the complete and final 
agreement of the parties hereto, and no other prior statement, representation or 
understanding shall be binding except as expressly set forth herein. 
HK CONTRACTORS, INC. 
By: ~~ 
Brent Faster 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS 
.... ,'-'"'''''\\ 
.:::-'\'O Bi. U{} tJ lt l ~~ .. ..... ~..., l; ~ ~ _::'(\) ... ···-v ,, 
ff~ ..... 0>~(9)@fiJl?~·-~~ . ~ 
t;;[ ~ ~ \:~y: l-+--~~7h.,....-~~ ____ '.?t_ fo--_ _  _ ? ~ •. ~ t ~ 11. ... ~ :1 inaMilam 
~, \ ··.~ .:·~ t' M 
11 ~ :-.. ,,·' "''..:: ayor 
it 1, : 1n.iii ·to"'$)"..::--.: 
~~~,,,~~...:- . . 
INSTRUMENf NO~O«t-t DATE -iJ. -tJ J 
INST.CODE j lMAGED PGS ",;. / 
!FEE +'" --e 
i STATE OF IDAHO } ss 
. COUNTY OF BONNEVJLLE ) 
1 hereby certify that the within 
insuumcot wns reco1ded. 
Ro Id Lon.,!!i!'I •e. CoUllty ,l.ecorder l 
. · l 
:~~~ 
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) 
: ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
On this 1-~~ay o~W. before me, the l!ndersigncd, a notary publ ic for 
Idaho, personally appeared LINDA M. MJLAM, known to me to be the Mayor of the City 
ofldaho Falls, the municipal corpo~·ation that executed the foregoing document, and 
acknowledged to nie that such City executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand a11d affixed my official 
seal the day and year first above written. 
(S 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss . 
Notary Public for State ofldaho 
Residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: tf2~ I lp · '2(1)(:; 
County of Bonneville ) ~~ 
On this _l _ day of~ 2005, before me, the undei:sigued, a notary public in and 
for said State, personally appeared BRENT FOSTER known or identified to me to be the 
President of the corporation that executed the instmment or the person who executed the 
instrument on behalf of said corporation, and acknowledged to me that such corporation. 
execut~d the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official 
seal, the day and year in this certificate first above written. 
~\N-~ 
".ii 
. · -
Notary Public for Idaho 
Re_ siding at Idaho Palls, Idaho 1 _ ( My Commission Expires: ? b l l 
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EXHIBIT A 
HK Pit Description 
Agreement 
Storm Sewer 
Beginning at a point which bears S02°09'5 l ''E 953 .65 feet along the section line from the 
West One-Quarter Corner of Section 33, Township 2 North, Range 38 East, B.M., the 
following boundary running along the boundaries described in the following Instrument 
records; 425775, 964183, 652363, 877670, 432059 and 1061244: 
Running thence S89° 18'30"E 350.87 feet; thence N02°09'50"W 346.65 teet; thence 
S88°43'17 11E 968.88 feet; thence N02°09'5011W 602.50 feet to the north boundary of the 
HK Pit; thence S88°40'44"E 13.81.92 feet; thence so·o0 56'59''E 1321.50 feet to the South 
boundary of the HK Pit; thence N89°14'58 11 W 2321._SJ feet along the said South 
Boundary; thence N02°09'50"W 365.85 feet; thence N89° 15'03"W 350.86 feet to the 
West line of Section 33; thence N02°09'51 11 W 30.00 feet to the point of beginning. 
Containing 58.31 acres, more or less. 
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EXIIlBITB 
STORM DRAINAGE EASEMENT 
~· 
INDENTURE made this 1 day o~~ 20~ by and between HK Contractors, 
Inc., an Idaho corporation, hereinafter referred to as "GRANTOR," and the CITY OF 
IDAHO FALLS, a municipal corporation, P. 0. Box 50220, Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405, 
hereinafter referred to as "GRANTEE"; 
WITNESSETH: 
FORAND IN CONSIDERATION of the sum of One and No/100 .Dollars ($1.00) 
and other good and valuable consideration paid by GRANTEE, receipt of which i~ hereby 
acknowledged, GRANTOR hereby grant, bargain and convey unto GRANTEE, and its 
successors and assigns forever, a permanent easement over and across the real property 
described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by this reference made a part hcre<rL 
This easement shall be used for the construction, operation and maintenance of a 
stonn drainage line, and associated pipes and appurtenant facilities. 
To have and to hold unto GRANTEE and its successors and a$signs forever. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, GRANTORS have hereunto subscribed their hands 
and seals on this day and year first above written. 
HK CONTRACTORS, INC. 
By~~ z . 
Brent foster 
President 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Bonneville ) ai\ 
On this t 4£: day o~, 2005, before me, the undersigned, a notary public in 
and for said State, personally appeared BRENT FOSTER known or identified to me to be 
the President of the corponition that executed the instrnment or the person who executed 
the instrument on behalf of said corporation, and acknowledged to me that such 
corporation executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official 
seal, the day and year irt this certificate first above written. 
~w-L~ 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Re$iding at Idaho Falls, Idaho l \ 
My Commission Expires: S lo I\ 
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EXHIBIT A 
HK Pit Description 
Agreement 
Storm Sewer 
Beginning at a point which bears S02°09'5 I "E 953 .65 feet along tlw se.ction line fro,rp the 
West One-Quarter Comer of Section 33, Township 2 North, Range 38 East, B.M., the 
following boundary running along the boundaries described in the following Instrument 
records; 425775, 964183, 652363, 877670, 432059 and 1061244: 
Running thence S89° 18'30"E 350.87 feet; thence N02°09'50"W 346.65 feet; thence 
S88°43'17"E 968.88 feet; thence N02°09'50"W 602.50 feet to the north boundary of the 
HK Pit; thence S88°40'44"E 1381.92 feet; thence S00°56'59"E 1321.50 feet to the South 
boundary of the HK Pit; thence N89°14'58"W 2321.53 feet along the said South 
Boundary; thence N02°09'50"W 365.85 feet; thence N89°15'03"W 350.86 feet to the 
West line of Section 33; thence N02°09'51 "W 30.00 feet to the point of beginning. 
Containing 58.31 acres, more or less. 
0 .\WPDAT AIDWS\2l0O\AGR\IIKStonn Drainage Agrccmcntv2.wpd:sm 
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EXHIBIT C 
GRANT DEED 
THIS INDENTURE, made this __ day of July, 2005, between HK Contractors, 
Inc., an Idaho corporation, hereinafter referred to as 11 GRANTOR, 11 and the City ofldaho 
Falls, ,t municipal corporation, whose mailing address is P. 0 . Box 50220, Idaho Falls, 
Idaho 83402, hereinafter referred to as "GRANTEE," 
WITNESSETH, that the said GRANTOR, for and in consideration of the sum of 
TEN AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($10.00), lawful money of the Uni~ed States of America, 
and other good and valuable consideration, to it in hand paid by GRANTEE, the receipt 
whereofis hereby acknowledged, doe_s by these presents sell, grant and forever coi.i.vey, 
unto the said GRANTEE, and to its successors and assigns, forever, all the foilowing 
described real estate, situated in County of Bonneville, State ofldaho, to-wit: 
See Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by this reference made a 
part hereof 
__ _/-
TOGETHER with all and singuiar the tenements, hereditaments and appurtemuwcs 
thereunto l;Jelongin.g or in anywise appertaining, and the reversion and ·reversions, 
reinain.der and remainders, and rents, issues and profits thereof. 
RESERVING, unto Grantee the right to mine and remove all gravel located within 
the property and further a right of ingress and egress over and across the demised property 
for the purpo:,e ofremoving such gravel. 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD, ail and singular, the said premises, together with the 
appmienances, unto the said GRANTI~E and its successors and assigns forever. 
21
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said GRANTORhas hereunto set its hand the day 
and year first above written. 
ATfEST: 
Secretary 
(SEAL) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
HK CONTRACTORS, INC. 
By: --------------
Brent Foster 
President 
On the __ day of July, 2005, before me, the undersigned, a notary public in and 
for said State, personally appeared BRENT FOSTER, known or identified to rne to be the 
President of the corporation that executed the instrument or the person who executed the 
instr1,1ment on behalf of said corpotaJion, and acknowledged to me that shch corporation 
executed the same, 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official 
seal, the day and year in this certificate first ;ibove written. 
(SEAL) 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho 
My Cbmrtiission Expires: ---',-------
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EXHIBIT A 
HK Pit Description 
Agreement 
Storm Sewet 
Beginning at a point which bears S02°09i51 ;,E 95j.65 feet along the section line from the 
West One-Quarter Corner of Section 33, Township 2 Nmth, Range 38 East, B.M., the 
following boundary running along the boundaries described in the following Instrument 
records; 425775, 964183, 652363, 877670, 432059 and 1061244: 
Running thence S89°18'3011E 350.87 feet; thence N02°09'5011W 346.65 feet; thence 
S88°43'17'1E 968.88 feet; thence N02°09'50 11W 602,50 feet to the north boundary of the 
HK Pit; thence S88°40'44"E 1381.92 feet; thence S00°56'5911E 1321.50 feet to the South 
boundary of the HK Pit; thence N89°14'58"W 2321.53 feet along the said South 
Boundary; thence N02°09'5011W 365.85 feet; thence N89°15'03i'W 350.86 feet to the 
West line of Section 33; thence N02°09'51 "W 30.00 feet to the point of beginning. 
Containing 58.31 acres, more or less. 
G:IWPDATAIUWS\2300\AGR\HKStonn Drainage Agreement.v2.wpd:sm 
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PUBLIC WORKS OE:PARTMt:.r.i I' 
HK Contractors Inc. 
Attn: Craig Mathison 
P.O. Box 51450 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Re: Storm Drainage Agreement 
Dear Mr. Mathison, 
March 9, 2016 
i 
Chris H' , ~rickseo, f>.E. I Public Works Director 
Office (208) 612-8256 
Fc1 x (208) 612-8570 
Thank you for taking the time to meet with me in my office on March 8th to discuss 
the Storm Drainage Agreement between the City of Idaho Falls and HK Contractors 
Incorporated (entered into on September 23, 2005, and referenced under record 1204003 
by the Bonneville County Recorder). As discussed , the agreement indicates under, Item 
2. Conveyance of Fee Title that HK Contractors agreed to convey the property very clearly 
by grant deed to the City not later than March 1, 2010. There are no other qualifications 
or contingencies regard ing deed execution and delivery in the Agreement. 
The City is currently evaluating potential uses for this property and asks that 
conveyance of fee title , as referenced in the Agreement, be executed , thereby transferring 
ownership to the City. 
Your consideration of this request is appreciated. Should you have any questions 
or wish to discuss this matter further, please contact me at your earliest convenience. The 
City looks forward to receiving the executed grant deed in the very near future, in order 
for the City to utilize the property for public purposes. 
cc: R. Fife 
2016-25 
G. Weitzel 
D. Richards 
Respectfu lly, 
Chris H Fredericksen, P.E. 
Public Works Director 
P.O. Box 50220 I 380 Constitution Way I Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405·0220 
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I 
PUBLIC WORKS OEPARi l . r Chris t,_ .dericksen, P.E. I Public Works Director 
IDAHO FALLS 
2. 
HK Contractors, Inc. 
Attn: Mr. Craig Mathison 
P.O. Box 51450 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
July 14, 2016 
Re: Storm Drainage Agreement - St. Clair Property 
Dear Mr. Mathison, 
Office (208) 612-8256 . 
Fax (208) 612-8570 
I am in receipt of your letter of June 16, 2016, and agree that the City and HK have experienced 
an excellent working relationship and fully anticipate that that will continue. I do wish to resolve 
the issue at hand and therefore request further clru'ification on some of the points within your letter. 
The City has no record of an official action by the Council altering either the City's contract with 
your company or determining not to abide by the conditions within the contract. In order to resolve 
this issue, the City requests clru-ification to the following: 
• Who was the official who notified Mr. Foster of this decision? 
• When was Mr. Foster so notified of the City's intent and was this notification in writing or 
verbal? 
• Did the person who notified Mr. Foster have actual authority from a majority vote of the 
City Council to give such notification to your knowledge? 
The City has relied upon the contract and expects HK to abide by the mutually agreed conditions 
of the contract. From the City's perspective, the City met all of the conditions required in the 
contract; however, it now appears that HK is unilaterally altering HK's obligation to abide by a 
written contract. 
I look forward to your response in writing at your eru·liest convenience, either from you or your 
legal representative, so that the City can better understand HK's position. The City is anxious to 
acquire both deed and possession of this property for the public. 
cc: Rebecca L. Noah Casper, Mayor; 
Randall D. Fife, City Attorney 
2016-72 
~/~J~ 
Chris H Fredericksen, P.E. 
Public Works Director 
P.O. Box 50220 I 380 Constitution Way I Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0220 
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Equal Oppor1l/Tllty EmplOy1'r 
August 12, 2016 
P.O. Box 51450 
Idaho Falls, fdaho 83405 
(208) 523-6600 
Fax (208) 523-6021 
City of idaho Falls 
Public Works Department 
Attn: Chris H Fredericksen, P.E. 
P.O. Box. 50220 
380 Constitution Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0220 
,Re: Stenn Drainage Agreement-St. Clair property 
Dear Mr. Fredericksen, 
Thank you for your letter of July 14, 2016. In response to your questions, Brent Poster does 
not know the exact date, but his best recoJlection is that in 2009, then parks and recreation 
director David Christensen verbally to Id him that the City of Idaho Falls was no longer 
interested in acquiring the property. The City's inactivity in the years that followed supports 
HK Contractors lnc!s position. As mentioned before, after receiving this notice from the 
City, HK relied on the City's position and subsequent inactivity t-0 make substantial 
investments in the property. Please understand, HK is not altering its obligation, but has 
relied on the notice from the City official and the course of conduct that followed. 
HK doe-s not intend to transfer the property to the City for another reason. The Stormwater 
Drainage Agreement required HK to convey the property to the City on or before March l, 
2010. When that date passed without HK conveying the property, the City could have 
brought a claim against HK for specific performance. Now, more than five years have 
passed and the applicable statute of limitations period has expired. While HK looks forward 
to wo*ing with the City in the future, it seems the City has waited too long to now expect 
HK to convey the property. 
If you wish to discuss this further, we invite you to contact our office. 
Craig Mathison 
HK Contractors, Inc. 
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C~NTRACTO.RS, _INC. 
·Equal Pi:ipor'i~nity E~ployer 
)1,ine. 16, 20.16 
P.O. Box 51450 
ldaho _Falls, l~a~o 8~405 
(20~) 523-6600 
Fax (208) 523-6021 
City ofJdal~o Falls_ 
Public Works ·oepartment 
Attn : Chris H Fr~de1j~ksen, P.E. 
P.O. Box 50220 
380. ConstitLiti.on Way 
Id~ho Fa:11s, ID 83405-0220 
Re: Storm Orainage Agreement- St. Clair property 
Dear Mr, Fre~ericksen, 
Thp.nk yo~ for ~1)9wi_ng us the tim_e to qmsi~~r the City's r¢qti~st tha~. HK Contr_actors Inc., 
deed the St. Clair property to the City. As you ·know, tl,e City an~ tlK h1_tve enjoyed a very 
good relafionship· ov~r the years. We ~xpe_ct al1d_ aesire that th_is relationship coi1ti11ues well 
into the future. 
As stated tn the $J;ornnyate1; D_rainage Agree_aje11tt H.K agreed-tci convey ~he property ori ()r 
befqi·~ ivfarch I, 20 I 0.-As that date. approached, a city official notified Brent Foster President 
of HK that the .Ciiy \.\las no longer inter~sted in acquiring the property becau~e· deve.loping the 
property into ri park would be tqo _ _e)i.pensive. Up t<;> that poin.t, Hk had been ·in the process of 
win9ing up its qperatjoils at the proi:i:eny. Howevei·, hi reliance on the Ci.ty's position, HK 
determined_ to keep the p·rope1ty a_nd't_o i11y,est jn _inak1ng tj1e prgperty°prqfjta)ije. Hi<. . 
prbcee_ded ~o invest s'ignificaht sums iiltQ the property to contiriue its productive use for the 
company, Since that time, HK heard nothing more from the City u·tit1 I we met. at your office 
ort March 8, 20·16. · 
Based on the P,as:sag~ oftiine, the ch_ange il'.l the City's position, <'lnd.HK's fu(·ther investment 
i11 the prop~rty, H_I{ does hot intend to ·transfer the pit property fo the City at this tfme. If you 
wish to discuss thii further, we invite you to cont~ct otir ofti°ce. 
Sinc;erely, / ,/-.--fr-
~}///~¼-== 
Craig Mathison 
HK.Co.ntractors, Inc. 
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8. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISBN 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
·,LL~ ''Qf'\I~' · -
• • , C. V vrll T, J !Mt" . 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Te lephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2ft'li Dt.C 19 PM ~: 02 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS, an Idaho municipal 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-16-6339 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
COMES NOW defendant, HK Contractors, Inc., by and through its attorney of record, 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq., ofthe firm Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC, and moves the court pursuant 
to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and Idaho Code Sections 5-216 and 5-225 for an order 
dismissing the plaintiff's First Amended Verified Complaint. 
This motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that the plaintiff's claims are 
barred by the statute of limitations. 
This motion is based on this Motion, the Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, the 
Notice of Hearing, and on the court's records and files herein. 
Defendant requests oral argument. 
MOTION TO DISMISS- Page 1 
F:\CLIENTS\BJD\9109 - HK Contractors, lnc\Pleadings\001.Motion to Dismiss.docx 
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( 
DATED this -1.!l__ day of December, 2016. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
By: ~~ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /9 day of December, 2016 I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS to be served by placing the same in a sealed 
envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or by hand delivery, 
facsimile transmission, or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] _,.Dvernight Delivery 
[vf Hand Delivery 
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box 
MOTION TO DISMISS- Page 2 
Randall D. Fife 
Michael A. Kirkham 
City of Idaho Falls 
375 D Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401 
.... 
B~ 
F:\CLI ENTS\BJD\9109 - HK Contractors, lnc\Pleadings\001.Motion to Dismiss.docx 
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B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISBN 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimi le: {208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant 
t ~ [ >., U, I I , 1J, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS, an Idaho municipal 
corporation, 
Pl ;:iintiff, 
V. 
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
Case No. CV-16-6339 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
The defendant, HK Contractors, Inc. {"HK"), files th is brief in support of its mot ion to 
dismiss the First Amended Verified Complaint ("Complaint") filed by the pla int iff, City of Idaho 
Falls ("City"). As explained more fully below, the court should dismiss t he City's Complaint 
because the City's claims are barred by the statute of limitations found in Idaho Code Section 5-
216 and Section 5-225. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS- Page 1 
F:\CLIENTS\BJD\9109 - HK Cont ractors, lnc\P leadings\002.Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss.docx 
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II. THIS COURT SHOULD DISMISS THE CITY'S COMPLAINT BECAUSE TH E CITY'S CLAIMS ARE 
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
A. The Court Must Dismiss A Complaint That Fails To State A Claim Upon Which 
Relief May Be Granted. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a party may move for dismissal of 
any claim that "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In considering such a 
motion, "the complaint must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it must be 
given the benefit of every reasonable intendment, and every doubt must be resolved in its 
favor." Gardner v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609, 610-611 (1975) (internal citations omitted). 
Nonetheless, "A complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when an affirmative 
defense appears on the face of the complaint itself." Id. at 611 (citations omitted). 
B. The Statute Of Limitations Is To Be Liberally Construed, While Exemptions To The 
Statute Of Limitations Are To Be Strictly Construed. 
Speaking of how courts are to consider and apply statute of limitations defenses, the 
Supreme Court of Idaho stated, "The statute of limitations is general, is to be liberally 
construed, and must be applied in all cases where an exception is not specifically made." 
Mendini v. Milner, 47 Idaho 439 (1929) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Peterson 
v. Gentillon, 154 Idaho 134, 189 (2013)). On the other hand, "Statutes creat ing exemptions [to 
the statute of limitations] are to be strictly construed and will not be extended by implication." 
Id. (emphasis added). 
C. The City's Claims Are Barred By The Five-Year Limitation Period of Section 5-216. 
Idaho Code Section 5-216 provides that an action on a written contract is barred if not 
brought within five years. Since 1919, Idaho Code Section 5-225 has provided, "The limitations 
prescribed in this chapter apply to actions brought in the name of the state, or for the benefit 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS- Page 2 
F:\CLIENTS\BJD\9109 - HK Contractors, lnc\Pleadings\002.Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss.docx 
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of the state, in the same manner as to actions by private parties." Although Section 5-225 only 
expressly mentions the state and does not mention municipalities, the Supreme Court of Idaho 
subsequently stated, "As a general rule, statutes of limitations run in favor of, as well as against, 
municipalities." Little v. Emmett Irr. Dist. , 45 Idaho 485 (1928) (citations omitted). Thus, the 
five-year limitation period of Section 5-216 applies to the City's claims in the same way it would 
apply to bar claims by any other private party. 
The Supreme Court of Idaho has applied the statute of limitat ions to various 
governmental entities and political subdivisions _to bar a broad variety of claims. See Norton v. 
Department of Employment, 94 Idaho 924, 926 {1972) (statute of limitations barred claim to 
recover unemployment benefits fraudulently obtained); White v. Conference Claimants 
Endowment Commission of the Idaho Annual Conference of the Methodist Church, 81 Idaho 17 
(1959) (statute of limitations barred claim to collect transfer tax); Hagan v. Young, 64 Idaho 318 
(1942) (statute of limitations barred claim to collect inheritance tax}; Little v. Emmett Irr. Dist., 
45 Idaho 485 (1928) (statute of limitations barred claim to collect on warrants); Bannock County 
v. Bell, 8 Idaho 1, 65 P. 710 (1901) (statute of limitat ions barred claim to recover public funds 
fraudulently received by former county employee}. 
Here, the affirmative defense of the statute of )imitations appears on the face of the 
City's Complaint . The City alleges that HK breached a written contract by not conveying a 
gravel pit to the City on March 1, 2010.1 In this regard, the City's claims accrued and its right to 
pursue its remedies arose at that time. However, the City did not commence this action until 
1 See 'll'll 8-9 of the First Amended Verified Complaint, already on file with the court . 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS- Page 3 
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November 22, 2016, 2 which is more than five years after the claims arose. Liberally applying 
Section 5-216 to the City's claims for breach of contract and waste (derived from the same 
contract), the court should dismiss the City's Complaint because more than five-years have 
elapsed since the claims arose. 
D. The City's Claims Are Not Exempt From The Limitation Period Because The City's 
Cla ims Do Not Arise From A High Constitutional Public Duty. 
There are a few instances when a city's claim is exempt from the statute of limitations. 
However, in considering whether a claim qualifies for an exemption, the court should keep in 
mind that "exemptions are to be strictly construed and will not be extended by implication ." 
Mendini v. Milner, 47 Idaho 439 (1929) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
One exemption to application of the statute of limitations is discussed in Elmore County 
v. Alturas County, 4 Idaho 145, 37 P. 349 (1894), where the state legislature enacted a specific 
statute dividing Alturas County, creating Elmore and Logan counties, modifying the boundary of 
Bingham County, and requiring the apportionment of Alturas County's debt among the 
result ing counties. The Supreme Court of Idaho held that the statute of limitations did not 
apply to bar the other counties' claims against Alturas County. The Court first explained, "It is[] 
well settled that a state is not barred by a statute of limitations, unless expressly named." Id. at 
350. In 1894, when the Court considered the Elmore County case, there was no mention of a 
statute expressly subjecting the state to the statute of limitations. However, this changed with 
the legislature's enactment of Idaho Code Section 5-225 in 1919, which specifically applied the 
statute of limitat ions to the state. In other words, had Elmore County came before the Court 
after the enactment of Section 5-225 in 1919, we likely would have seen a different result. 
2 See Verified Complaint, already on file with the court. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS- Page 4 
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The Elmore County opinion continued, "As respects public rights or property held for 
public use upon trusts, municipal corporations are not within the operation of the statute of 
limitations; but with regard to mere private rights or contracts the rule is different, and such 
corporations may plead, and have pleaded against them, the statutes of limitations." Id. at 
350 (emphasis added}. The Court relied on the specific and detailed legislative act dividing 
Alturas County and requiring apportionment of its debt to hold that the statute of limitations 
did not bar the claims against Alturas County. 
The Supreme Court of Idaho recognized another exemption from the statute of 
limitations in State v. Peterson, 61 Idaho 50, --, 97 P.2d 603, 605 (1939}, where the Supreme 
Court of Idaho did not apply the statute of limitations to bar a cla im by the state to foreclose a 
mortgage that secures a loan from the public school endowment fund created by the Idaho 
Constitution. The Court ruled that "[a]s respects public rights or property held for public use 
upon trusts, municipal corporations are not within the operation of the statute of limitations." 
(Citations omitted) (italics in original}. The Court reasoned this exemption from the statute of 
limitations was appropriate because "[t]he higher the sovereignty and the more sacred (not 
used in a religious sense) and public the function involved the greater the reason for immunity" 
from the statute of limitations defense. Id. {parenthetical in original}. The claim in Peterson 
arose from "the state as trustee performing a high constitutional public duty ... the handling of 
[] public school funds." Id. (emphasis added}. The Court did not bar the state's claim because 
"[t]he trust relationship here is of the highest order and should be protected to the utmost." 
Id. at 606. The state of Idaho is the highest sovereign. The duty derived from the Constitution, 
the most "sacred" source of duty. Under these circumstances, the Court did not bar the claim . 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS-Page 5 
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A third exemption from the statute of limitations is found in American National Bank of 
Idaho Falls v. Joint Independent School Dist. No. 9, 61 Idaho 405, 102 P.2d 826 (1940), which 
presents the unique case where the state legislature enacted a moratorium on collection of 
certain taxes. The Supreme Court of Idaho refu sed to apply the statute of limitations to bar th e 
claims where the legislature had expressly prevented collection by moratorium. "It is 
unreasonable to assume that the legislature meant to withdraw from the school district the 
means and remedy for collecting existing assessment.. .and at the same time allow t he statute 
of lim itations to continue to run and bar the debts." Id. at 827. 
Here, the City's claims against HK are not exempted from the statute of limitations. 
Unl ike Elmore County, there is no specific statute requ iring the City to acquire the gravel pit 
from HK. The City is not relying on any statutory or Constitutional duty in bringing its claims. 
To the contrary, the City's claims derive from a private contract. The Storm Drainage 
Agreement ("Agreement") is a contract between the City and HK wherein the City seeks 
"additional property for the purpose of storing storm drainage waters flowing from the 
Kensington Park [subdivision] pond." 3 The plain language of the Agreement indicates that the 
City desired additional storm drainage capacity for the Kensington Park subdivis ion. Then by 
mutual agreement-not by some statutory duty or by process of eminent domain-the City 
negotiated to acqu ire the gravel pit from HK based on the land's convenient proximity to the 
Kensington Park pond. The City even pleads its claims as "Count I - Breach of Contract" and 
"Count II - Waste" (based on the same contract). 4 Clearly, un like Elmore County, the City's 
3 See p. 1 of Exhibit 1 to t he First Amended Verified Complaint, already on fil e wit h the court . 
4 See pp. 2-3 of the First Amended Verified Complaint, already on file wit h the court. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS- Page 6 
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claims herein do not arise from "public rights or property held for public use upon trusts," but 
rather, arise from "mere private rights or contracts." Elmore County, supra, 37 P. at 350. 
Similarly, the City's claims do not fall within the exemption applied in State v. Peterson 
because here the City is not acting as a "trustee performing a high constitutiona l public duty," 
such as handling public school funds as required by Idaho's Constitution. Review of Idaho's 
Constitution produced no mandate that municipalities acquire fee title to private property for 
stormwater drainage purposes. Again, the City's claims expressly derive from a private 
contract, not a "high constitutional public duty." 
Final ly, unlike American National Bank of Idaho Falls, the legislature did not enact a 
moratorium in the past six years that prevented the City from asserting its contractual rights 
before the limitations period ended. Without constraint, the City sat on its rights beyond the 
limitation period. 
If collection ~fa transfer tax, collection of an inheritance tax, recovery of fraudulently 
received public funds, and recovery of fraudulently received unemployment benefits all fall 
short of the "high constitutional public duty" required to exempt claims from the statute of 
limitations, the City's private contractual claim to acquire the gravel pit from HK fal ls even 
shorter. See White v. Conference Claimants Endowment Commission of the Idaho Annual 
Conference of the Methodist Church, 81 Idaho 17 (1959); Hagan v. Young, 64 Idaho 318 (1942); 
Bannock County v. Bell, 8 Idaho 1, 65 P. 710 (1901); Norton v. Department of Employment, 94 
Idaho 924, 926 (1972). Strictly applying any the recognized exemptions, the City's claims do not 
qua lify for exemption and are barred. 
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r 
Ill. CONCLUSION. 
Because the claims set forth in the Complaint are barred by Section 5-216, the City has 
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As such, the court should grant HK's 
motion to dismiss the Complaint. 
DATED this J$- day of December, 2016. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
" 
By: _..,,./.542~w,..:_~~ ~-~---
yKoriscott 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 4 day of December, 2016 I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS to be served by 
placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, or by hand delivery, facsimile transmission, or overnight delivery, addressed to the 
following: 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] pvernight Delivery [ vf Hand Delivery 
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box 
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Randall D. Fife/ISB # 4010 
Michael A Kirkham/ISB #8939 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS 211S DEC Z9 A 9: 26 
375 D. Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83401 
Telephone: (208) 612-8178 
Facsimile: (208) 612-8175 
Attorney for City ofldaho Falls, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS, an Idaho ) 
municipal corporation, ) Case No. CV-2016-6339 
) 
Plaintiff, ) BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
vs. ) 
) 
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
---------- --- -
BACKGROUND 
On September 1, 2015, Defendant's President, Brent Foster, acting on behalf 
of Defendant delivered a signed and notarized Storm Drainage Agreement 
("Agreement") to the City of Idaho Falls ("City'). Verified Complaint at~ 6. On 
September 22, 2005, the City Council of the City approved and executed the 
Agreement. Id. ,i 6. As part of the Agreement, Defendant agreed to convey a parcel 
of real property which was then being used as a gravel pit by March 1, 2010. Id. 17. 
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Despite the fact that the City performed all of its obligations under the Agreement, 
Defendant has not performed its duty to convey the gravel pit to the City. Id. 18-11. 
In ea1·ly 2016, the City was evaluating uses for public properties held by the 
City, when it discovered that the deed had not been transferred by Defendant, as 
per the Agreement. Id. Exhibit 2, March 9, 2016 lettet, The City met with 
Defendant on March 8, 2016, to discuss the Agreement and then demanded 
performance in writing on March 9, 2016. Id. On June 16, 2016, Defenda11t refused 
m·writing to convey the deed, stating an unnamed City official was no longer 
interested in acquiring the property. Id. Exhibit 3, June 16, 2016 letter. In response 
to the City's inquiry into the unnamed City official, Defendant ag·ain refused to 
convey on August 12, 2016, stating· that verbal communication was received from a 
City official releasing· Defendant from its obligation to perform and, in any event, 
the Statute of Limitations released Defendant from its duty to perform the 
Agreement. Id. Exhibit 3, August 12, 2016 letter. 
On November 23, 2016, City filed a Verified Complaint with this Court. On 
Novembe1· 30, 2016, Defendant filed an Acceptance of Service of City's Complaint 
and Summons. Then, on December 19, 2016, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Idaho Civil Service Rules, and brief in support of 
that motion. This brief is the City's response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A nonmoving- party is entitled to have all inferences from the record and 
pleadings viewed in its favor . Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 398 
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(1999). The issue to be detel'mined is not whether the nonmoving party will 
ultimately prevail, but whether the nonmoving party is entitled to offer evidence to 
support their claims. Orthman u. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 962 (1995). 
Motions to dismiss on the basis of Statutes of Limitation are g·enerally viewed 
with disfavor. Singleton v. Forster, 89 Idaho 149, 151 (1977). The Statute of 
Limitation is an affirmative defense for which Defendant bears the burden of pl'oof. 
Mason v. Tucker and Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 487 (1994). In a contract case, the 
ques~ion of when the breach of contract occurred is a factual one, Spence v. Howell, 
126 Idaho 763, 771 (1995). 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff, the City of Idaho Falls, files this brief in opposition to Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss City's Verified Complaint. Defendant's motion should be denied 
because (1) there is a material factual issue on when Defendant breached the contact; 
(2) Idaho Code §5-216's five (5) year Statute of Limitations on written agreements 
does not apply to the City; (3) Statutes of Limitations that would interfere with the 
City's constitutional and trustee duties to the public do no_t apply to the City; and (4) 
. . . 
there are substantial public policy reasons not to apply any Statute of Limitation in 
this case. 
1. Defendant's 12(b)(6) motion should be denied because there is a material 
factual issue regarding when Defendant breached the Agreement. 
Idaho Code§ 5-216,s five (5) year Statute of-Limitations on written agreements 
begins to run once a party becomes aware of the breach. Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 
551, 517 (2008) In Cuevas v. Barraza, the Idaho Supreme Court examined whether a 
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defaulted litigant was entitled to set aside a default judgment. Id. In evaluating· 
whethe1· the Statute of Limitations applied the defaultGd litigant's potential defense, 
the Idaho SupTeme Court noted, that for Idaho Code § 5-216's limitations pm·poees, 
'
1[t]he five-year statute of limitations for [the .defaulted litigant] to bring this breach 
of contract claim began when [the defaulted litigant) became aware of the breach," 
Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also noted that a party's notice of breach is 
requirnd befol'e the Statute of Limitations can run in Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763 
(1995) . In that case a jury found that a developer had breached an oral contract to 
develop a Christian retreat with a landowner. Id. at 719. The developer made a 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict to set aside the jury's finding·. Id. at 
722. The developer asserted that it had breached the contract eight (8) years before 
the lawsuit was filed and that it was too late for the landowners to act. Id. at 722. 
Ultimately, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the trial court's finding· that there was 
substantial evidence that the landowners did not receive notice of the breach ·until a 
year prior to the filing date. Id. The date that a paTty receives notice of a breach, is 
the date that the Statute of Limitations begins to run. 
The City did not become aware of Defendant's breach until Defendant refused 
in writing to transfer the deed on June 16, 2016. The Agreement at issue in this case 
was executed in 2005. Verified Complaint at Exhibit 1. Defendant's performance was 
to be determined, at Defen.dant's sole discretion, to occur at any ti.me after the 
execution of the Ag-reement. Id. Even after the expiration of Defendant's fir st date of 
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agreed performance (March 1, 2010), Defendant had a contin1.ling- duty to perform the 
Agreement by delivering a deed to the City. 
The City currently holds for the benefit of the public over 140 different pieces 
of real estate. Many of these real properties are not currently developed for a 
particular public purpose, but all are held for future public purposes. As a specific 
p1.lblic purpose arises that requires real property, the City reviews whether any of the 
public properties in its public trust portfolio would meet those public needs. 
Earlier this year, the City was reviewing· public real properties that could be 
used for expected upcoming· public projects. In this review, the City discovered that 
Defendant had not yet conveyed the deed to the gravel pit prope1·ty, which is the 
subject matter of the contract dispute in this case. After the City requested on March 
9, 201G, that the Defendant perform, Defendant then gave·fii-st notice to the City on 
June 16, 2016, that it intended to never pei·form. It is the City's contention that, prior 
to June 16, 2016, the City did not have notice that Defendant would not perform. The 
Statute of Limitations, if it is even applicable in this case (which the City asserts is 
not the case), did not begin to run until June 16, 2016, and Defendant's motion should 
be dismissed on these grounds. 
2. The . plain language of Idaho Code § 5-216 conclusively shows that the 
Statute of Limitations does not apply to the City because the City is a 
subdivision of the State of Idaho and the contract confers a beJ1efit to the 
"state." 
When interpreting a statute, courts mt1st begin with the statute's plain 
language, giving the words their plain, tlsual, and ordinary meanings. State v. Owens, 
158 Idaho 1, 3 (2014). The Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of 
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the statute so that none· of the words are void, superfluous, or redundant. St. 
Alphonsus Reg. Med. Center v. Gooding Cnty., 159 Idaho 84, 86-87 (2015). When 
interpreting terms in statutes, courts consider the whole act at issue, including 
amendments . St. Lu.ke's Magic Vf!lley Reg. Med. Cntr. Ltd. v. Bd. Of Cnty. Com'r8 of 
Gooding Cnty., 149 Idaho 684, 588 (2010). 
When Idaho Code § 5-216 is given its plain 01·dinaTy meaning, the five (5) year 
Statute of Limitations does not apply to the City ofldaho Falls for at least the two (2) 
reasons discussed in this section of the brief. First, as a s1.1bdivision of the State of 
Idaho, this action is being broug·ht in the name of the "state." Second, this actions 
seeks to enforce a contract that will benefit the "state ." 
a. As a subdivision of the State ofldaho. Idaho Code § 5-216 specifically exempts the 
City of Idaho Falls from the five (6) year statute of limitations on written 
contracts. 
Idaho Code § 5-216 provides that actions upon written contract must be 
brought within five (6) years. However, the statute also provides an exemption for 
when governmental entities seek to enforce contracts. The relevant provision of 
§ 5-216 states: 
The limitations prescribed by this this section shall never apply to 
actions in the name or for the benefit of the state and shall neve1· be 
asserted nor interposed as a defense to any action in the name or for the 
benefit of the state although such }_imitations may have become fully 
operative as a defense prior to the adoption of this amendment. 
(emphasis added). The term "state" includes the Idaho state government and all of its 
political subdivisions. See Bannock Cnty. v. Bell, 8 Idaho 1, 65 P. 710, 712 (1901) 
(holding that § 4061, a previous codification of the current § 5-226, applies against 
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counties, towns, and cities). This interpretation of the ordinary meaning· term "state" 
has consistently been used by the Idaho Constitution, the Idaho Legislature, and the 
Idaho Supreme Court. 
The Idaho Constitution, the foundational governing ·document for the state of 
Idaho, expressly identifies Idaho cities as subdivisio11:s of the state three (3) times. 
Idaho Const. Art. VIIIi § 2(4) ("municipalityn shall include any county, city, municipal 
corporation, . , . or other special purpose district or political subdivision of the state 
established by law.';) (emphasis added); Idaho Const. Art. VIII, § 3 ("No county, city, 
board of education, or school district, or other subdivision of the state . . .'') (emphasis 
added); Idaho Const. Art. VIII, § 4 (No co\mty, city, town, township, board of 
education, or school district, or other subdivision , , .") (emphasis added). 
The Idaho Leg·islatu.1·e has expressly identified Idaho cities and counties as 
subdivisions of the state ofldaho more than twenty (20) times in the Idaho Code. 1 A 
typical example of the Legislature's many descriptions of political subdivisions as the 
"state" appears in Idaho Code §7-1303(6). In§ 7-1303(6) the Legislature states that a 
"'[p]olitical subdivision' means the state ofldaho'' including "any jncorporated city ... 
of the state of Idaho." 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also recognized that cities, like counties, are 
subdivisions of the state , Big Sky Paramedics, LLC' v. Sagle Fire Diat., 140 Idaho 435, 
437 (2004) (observing that cities are governmental subdivisions); Village of Lapwai 
1See Idaho Code§§ 6-902(2); 7-1303(6); 18-5703(b); 20-801(3); 21-lOl(m); 22-4505; 33-133(l)(a); S9-
3502(16); 39-5502; 39-7103; 39-8302; 40-117(6); 41-4102(9), 50-3102; 67-458; 67-2327; 67-6•103(:f); 67-
8002(1); 67-8702; 79-401; and 74-202. 
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v. Alligier, 78 Idaho 124, 128-29 (1956) (stating that in exercise of their duties and 
powers, municipalities act as agents of the state pel'forming the state's governmental 
functions.); City of Sandpoint v. Independent Highway District, 2016 WL 6462148, *4 
(Idaho 2016) (observing· that government ~ubclivisions, such as cities, may not 
disregard governmental duties assigned by the legislature.) 
Because the Idaho Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the term 
"state" in § 5-225 to apply to Idaho's political subdivisions, this Court should also 
apply the Supreme Court's interpretation of "state" across all of Chapter 2 of Title 5 
of the Idaho Code. The Idaho Supreme Court has had opportunity to interpret the 
term "state" in Idaho Code § 5-225 in at least two (2) cases. Bannock Cnty. v. Bell, 8 
Idaho 1, 65 P. 710, 712 (1901); Blaine Cnty, v. Butte Cnty., 46 Idaho 193, 193 (1927). 
In Bannock County v. Bell, the Idaho Supreme court noted that Idaho Code § 4061, a 
previous codification of the current Idaho Code § 5-225, applied against counties, 
towns, and cities. 65 P. at 712. The effect of the Idaho Supreme Comt's majority 
decision was not lost on the dissenting· Justice, who noted, correctly, that the majority 
opinion would now apply the Statutes of Limitations to run against the state and 
every s1..1bdivision of the state. Id at 712. Twenty-six (26) years later, in Blaine County 
v. Butte County, the Idaho Supreme Comt again acknowledged that the term "state" 
in Idaho Code § 6618, the next codification of the current Idaho Code § 5-225, 
included Idaho's political subdivisions. ("The statute of limitations of this state is 
expressly made applicable to the state. It is, therefore, applicable to the counties of 
the state ,") 
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As stated above, when interpreting terms in statutes, courts must consider the 
whole act at issue, including amendments. St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg. Med. Cntr. 
Ltd. v. Bd. Of Cnty. Com'rs of Gooding Cnty., 149 Idaho 584, 588 (2010). Courts also 
must interpret terms in various sections -in order to produce a harmonious result. 
Ashely v. Dept, of Health and Welfare, 108 Idaho 1, 2 (1986). Because the Idaho 
Supreme Court has already interpreted the term "state" in§ 5-225 to include Idaho's 
political subdivisions, this Court should also apply that definition. to § 5-216 in order 
to keep these two sections in harmony when read togethel'. Adopting an alternative 
definition in§ 6-216's "state'' would result in ajaning, unharmonious reading of the 
sections. 
Idaho Code § 5-216 uses the same phrase as § 6-225. Its language is nearly 
identical to the language in§ 5-225. Idaho Code § o-225's language reads ''in the name 
of the state, for the benefit of the state," Idaho Code § 6-216's language mads "in the 
name or for the benefit of the state." Adopting contrasting interpretations of these 
sections would frustrate a harmonious consistent meaning when reading these 
related sections together. 
A close look at the timehne of the adoption of these two (2) statutes (§§ 5-216 
and 5-225) sheds some helpful light on the Legislature's intention to include political 
subdivisions for § 6-2161s exemption to the Statute of Limitations. Both sections were 
codified in the Idaho Code in 1881. However, the previous codification of§ 5-216 did 
not include the exemption at issue in this case until 1939. See Peterson v. State, 61 
Idaho 60 (1939). As the Idaho Supreme Court observes in Peterson u. State, § 5-116 
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originally read "[w ]ithin five years: An action upon any contract, obligation or liability 
founded upon an instrument in writing·." Id. In the same year as Peterson was 
decided, the Idaho Legislature amended§ 5-116 to include the following exception: 
The limitations prescribed by this section shall never apply to actions in 
the name or for the benefit of the state and ·shall never be asserted nor 
interposed as a defense to any action in the name or fo1· the benefit of 
the state although· such limitations may have become fully operative as 
a defense prior to the adoption of this amendment. 
(emphasis added), 
Applying the well-established p1·inciples of statutory construction, this CoUl't 
should infer that the Legislature was aware of the Idaho Supreme Court's prior 
interpretations of§ 5-225 in Bannock County and Blain County when the Legislature 
amended § 5-216's limitation on written contracts. When the Legislature used 
virtually identical language-as was analyzed by the Court in Bannock County and 
Blain County to exempt written contract actions brought "in the name or for the 
benefit of the state" from the five (5) year statute of limitations-the Leg·islature was 
evincing its intent. The Legislative intent of§ 5-116 was to exempt not only the state 
of Idaho from the five (5) year statute of limitations, hut also all of Idaho's political 
subdivisions, including Idaho cities. 
b. Idaho Code § 5-216 exempts the contract at issue in this case from the five year 
Statute of Limitations on written contracts because it will benefit the State of 
Idaho. 
Even if this court determines that the term "state,'' as used in in Idaho Code 
§ 5-216 does not include Idaho's subdivisions, the language of§ 5-216 exempts this 
case from the five (5) yea1· limitation because the contract at issue in this case benefits 
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the State of Idaho. Idaho cities cannot perform any function except those that have 
been granted to cities by the Idaho Constitution and the Idaho Legislature. Caesar v. 
State, 101 Idaho 158, 160 (1980). Only through the State of Idaho's authority can the 
City of Idaho Falls prosecute crimes in the name of the state, hold property for the 
benefit of the public, or otherwise provide for the public health and safety. Idaho Code 
§ 50-302; Sanchez v. City of Caldwell, 135 Idaho 465, 468 (2001). Because Idaho cities 
provide a direct benefit to the people and government of the State of Idaho, and 
because the City seeks to enforce the contact at issue to continue to provide its 
benefits to the State of Idaho, this Court should dismiss Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss. 
Where there is a factual question whether the contract at issue will benefit the 
State ofidaho, this Court should dismiss Defendant's motion because of that material 
fact issue. Th~ issue here is not whether t he City will ultimately prevail in showing· 
that the contract will benefit the State ofidaho, although the City believes that it will 
prevail. The issue whether the City is entitled to offer evidence to support its claim. 
See Orthman, 126 Idaho at 962. The City should have its day in court. 
3. The City's claims are exempt from the limitation period because the City's 
claims arise from its constitutional duty and authority to hold property 
for the b enefit of the public. 
RECEIVE: 
When a municipal corporation holds public rig·hts or property held for public 
use upon trusts, municipal corporations are not within the Statute of Limitations. As 
Defendant notes, this rule was articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court more than 
one hundred (100) years ago in Elmore County v. Alturaa County, 4 Idaho 145 (1894). 
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Defendant needlessly speculates that had Elmore County came before the Idaho 
Supreme Court after 1919, the Court may have reached a different result because 
Defendant asserts that the Idaho Legislature did not adopt Idaho Code § 5-225's 
application of the statutes of limitations against the state until 1919. However, 
Defendant has misstat ed the adoption date of this particular statute of limitation. y Fortunately, this Court need not speculate § 6-225's effect on the Elmore 
- C;~nty's holding because§ 6-225 was originally codified as § 165 in 1881. Thereafter 
. the statute was renumbered and codified as § 4061 in 1887 and 1909. In fact, the 
Idaho Supreme Court directly quotes § 4061, the previous codification of the current 
§5-226, in its analysis of Elmore County. 4 Idaho at 154. ("The limitations prescribed 
in this title apply to actions brought in the name of the state, ox· for the benefit of the 
state.''). As a result, no legislative change has modified the rule established by the 
Court in Elmore County. 
State v. Peterson, 61 Idaho 50 (1939), holds that the government, in its role as 
a trustee of public rights and property, is not subject to a Statute of Limitation where 
application of the Limitation would, in effect, transfer a public benefit to a private 
interest . In Peterson, a couple received a loan, guaranteed by a mortgage on the 
couple's property, from the State's public school endowment fund. 61 Idaho at 50-51 . 
Under the t erms of the loan contract, the couple was required to make full repayment 
by April 1929. Id. Although the parties mutually extended the maturity date, ·the 
couple ceased all payment in December 1932. Id. The State did not bring its action 
until December 1938, six (6) years after the couple's last payment. Id. In response to 
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the State's foreclosme action, the couple asserted that Idaho Code § 5-216's five (5) 
year limitation to actions based on written agreements was applicable against the 
State (relying on§ 5-225), 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Idaho deteTmined in Peterson that the 
Statute of Limitations did not apply because its application would be against public 
policy. The Court observed that, if the couple wete permitted to use the Statute of 
Limitations against the State, then the public school endowment fund would 
essentially be converted from its public benefit to the couple's private use. The Court 
stated in part, 
'' ... it is evident that to give such efficacy to a statute of limitations of a 
state as would operate to confer a permanent right of possession to any 
portion thereof upon an individual for his private use would be to allow 
that to be done by indirection which could not be done directly." 
61 Idaho at 607. (emphasis added). 
Similar to the situation in Peterson, an order holding that § 5-116 bare 
enforce1nent of Defendant's promise to deed property to the public would allow 
Defendant indirectly to do something· that it could not do directly (i.e., retain real 
property it ag;reed to deed to the City to benefit the public). Defendant's assertion 
that the Statute of Limitations applies against the City in this case raises the same 
public }JOlicy concerns that compelled the Idaho Supreme Court in Peterson to hold 
that the Statue of Limitations could not be applied against public trustees.2 
2 Note that Idaho Code § 5-116 was amended by the State Leg'islature the same year as the Idaho 
Supreme Court's holding in Peterson, u. State, but afte1· that decision. As explained above, it should 
be inferred that the Idaho Legislature is aware of the Idaho Supreme Comt's decisions. With the 
amendment to § 5-116, the Idaho Legislature expanded the Supreme Court's holding in Peterson, 
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Idaho's cities are trustees of city funds and public lands that cities hold to 
benefit the public. See Hodges v. Lemp, 24 Idaho 399 (1913) (holding that surplus 
lands left over from town-site claims, inure to the benefit of the city with the mayor 
acting as trustee). Idaho's cities continue to hold public lands, in trust, for the benefit 
of the public. As such, the City holds property and transacts business with the same 
sacred trust as "high constitutional public duty" as the State did in the Peterson case . 
In this case, the City has a property rig·ht and a contract rig,ht to receive a deed from 
Defendant. As Defendant's Motion to Dismiss this case would interfere with the City's 
trust duties, and allow Defendant "permission" to breach an ongoing duty to deliver 
the deed, Defendant's motion should be dismissed. 
4. Public policy requires that the statute of limitations on written contracts 
should not be applied to Idaho cities seeking to enfol'ce contxacts. 
Public policy requires that the Statute of Limitations should not be applied in 
this case bBcause it would permit Defendant to avo~1 performance simply because 
Defendant had control over its performance and chose to quietly avoid its 
obligations. "A cottrt will not permit a party to avoid its contractual obligations." 
Smith v. Idaho State University Federal Credit Union, 114 Idaho 680, 684 (1988). 
There is a principle of justice, observed by the Idal~o Supreme Court, that when 
performance is left to tho determination of one party alone, then that party must act 
in good faith. See Cheney v. Jemmett, 107 Idaho 829, 832 (1984). 
exempting writtei1 agteements with the state involving a "hig·h constitutional dutj?' from the five 
year Statute of limitations, to all written agreements with the state and its political aubdivisiona. 
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This Court should not make a determination in this case that would allow 
Defendant to take advantag·e of its own willful inaction. In this case, the City agreed 
that Defendant "in its sole discretion" would determine when Defendant's business 
of gravel mining and crushing was concluded. At the conclusion of Defendant's 
business, Defendant would then be required to convey the property. While the 
parties agreed that Defendant would conclude "in no event later than March 1, 
2010," the time to perform Defendant's obligation vrns always up to Defendant. 
Presuming· that Defendant would act in good faith and perform, City did not 
monitor Defendant's perfo1·mance or pester Defendant for the deed. 
Defendant now seeks to take advantage of the City's trust that Defendant 
would wrap up mining the gTavel pit and then perform. By r emaining quiet instead 
of performing, Defendant appeared to have adopted a "wait and see" approach to see 
if or when the City would demand performance. In the meantime, Defendant 
continued to mine and use up_ the gravel pit's resources, even thoug·h those 
resources were part of the property that was promised to the public. Determining 
that the Statute of Limitations applies in this situation would reward Defendant's 
willful inaction and deprive the public from a benefit that was negotiated through 
an arm's length transaction, especially where the City performed all of its 
obligations under the contract. 
Additionally, if the Court grants Defendant's motion, the City will necessarily 
need to become much more aggressive, assertive, and perhaps litigious to protect 
the public's rights. It would be unwise for the City to presume that others will act in 
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good faith and would likely consider litigation to preserve the public's rights the day 
after a failure to perform, in order to preserve public rights and property from being 
taken from an application of the Statue of Limitations against the City. To the City, 
which owns multiple properties and enters into hundreds of contracts annually, a 
five (5) year Statute of Limitations application would require a great change in how 
it "does business." The City, like many public agencies, must manage the public's 
interests and property with fewer resources than many private interests have to 
manage their private interests. If the Statute of Limitations apply in this case, then 
the City will have to reallocate its management resou1·ces to uphold its trustee 
duties to the public by zealously pursuing every suspected breach of contract well 
within five (5) years. Gone will be the day the City can rely on the other party to 
perform. 
Allowing parties to willfully breach to see if a public agency notices and 
encouraging public ag·encies to litigate suspected breaches does not further a sound 
public policy. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
For the reasons set out above, the City respectfully requests that the Court 
deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss this action, that it hold that the Statute of 
Limitations is inapplicable in this case, and that it order the Defendant to file an 
. Answer to the City's Verified Complaint. 
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Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
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SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
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P.O. Box 50731 
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Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
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• 
IN TH E DISTRICT COURT OF TH E SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS, an Idaho municipal 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-16-6339 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
I. THERE IS NO FACTUAL DISPUTE THAT THE CITY'S CLAIMS AGAINST HK ACCRUED ON 
MARCH 2, 2010. 
In its opposition to the defendant HK Contractor, lnc.'s (" HK") pending motion to 
dismiss, the plaintiff, City of Idaho Falls ("City"), suggests that this court should deny the motion 
because there is a factual issue concerning when HK breached the Storm Dra inage Agreement 
("Agreement").1 While it is true that "[t]he time when a cause of action accrues may be a 
question of law or a question of fact, depending upon whether any disputed issues of material 
fact exist," the law is equally clear that " [w]here there is no dispute over any issue of material 
1 See pp. 3-5 of the Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss dated December 28, 2016, already on file 
with the court. 
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fact regarding when the cause of action accrues, the question is one of law for determination 
by the court ." Kimbrough v. Reed, 130 Idaho 512,516 (1997) (internal quotations omitted). 
Here, there is no dispute over the materia l facts surrounding the breach of the 
Agreement . The City alleges, and the Agreement expressly provides, that HK w ill "convey to the 
City .. .fee title to the HK Property ... in no event later than March 1, 2010."2 The City fu rther 
alleges that HK "did not convey t he gravel pit to [the City) on or before March 1, 2010."3 HK 
acknowledges that the Agreement recited that HK would convey the property to the City on or 
before March 1, 2010, and that HK did not convey the property to the City by that date. These 
are the sole and und isputed operat ive facts for purpose of considering the statute of limitations 
defense. As there is no dispute over the materia l facts surrounding the City's claim that HK 
breached the Agreement, the question is purely one of law for the court to decide. 
In this regard, Idaho law is clear that "[a] cause of action for breach of contract accrues 
upon breach for lim itation purposes." Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 517 (Ct. App . 2008) 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). Stated another way, "under Idaho law, a cause of action 
generally accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when a party may maintain a 
lawsuit against another." Western Corp. v. Vanek, 144 Idaho 150, 151 (2006) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added); see also Mason v. Tucker & Associates, 125 Id aho 429, 436 (Ct. App . 
1994) ("A cause of action for breach of contract accrues upon the breach") (emphasis added); 
and Galbraith v. Vangas, Inc., 103 Idaho 912, 915 (Ct. App. 1982) ("The cause of action accrues, 
and the statute of limitations begins to run, when a party may sue another'') (emphasis added) . 
2 See ,i 8 of the Verifi ed Compl aint, and pp . 1-2 of th e Agreemen t, a co py of which is attached as Exh ibit 1 to the 
Verified Comp laint dated November 22, 2016, alrea dy on fil e with t he court. 
3 See ,i 9 of the Ve rifi ed Compl aint dated November 22, 2016, already on file wi t h the court. 
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When an agreement requires a party to performance at specific times, a claim for breach of the 
agreement accrues upon failure of the party to perform at the specific time as agreed. Horkley 
v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 879, 880 (2007) . 
Here, there is no question that the City could have sued HK for breach of contract on 
March 2, 2010, the day after the Agreement required HK to convey the property to the City and 
HK had not done so. All the City had to do to state a claim was to recite that the Agreement 
required HK to convey the property to the City by no later than March 1, 2010, and that HK had 
not done so. The Supreme Court of Idaho notes that "it is presumed that each man is capable 
of understanding the nature and effect of his contracts." Olsen v. Hawkins, 90 Idaho 28, 33 
{1965); see also Liebelt v. Liebelt, 118 Idaho 845,848 {Ct. App. 1990) {"It is well established that 
a person who has executed a contract is presumed capable of understanding the nature and 
effect of such contract"). The City cannot reasonably claim that it was unaware of the breach 
or required notice of the breach because the City signed the document confirming t he date of 
the breach. Notice of the breach is not only imputed to the City, but expressly documented by 
the City's execution of the Agreement. Thus, under well-established Idaho law, t he statute of 
limitations on the City's cause of action for breach of contract accrued on March 2, 2010. 
In its opposition to the motion to dismiss, the City recites that the court in Cuevas v. 
Barraza, 146 Idaho 511 (Ct. App. 2008), wrote that the statute of limitations on Barraza's claim 
for breach of contract "began to run when Barraza became aware of the breach," 146 Idaho at 
517. However, the breach that Barraza claimed was not based on Cuevas' failure to perform an 
express requirement of their contract. Rather, Barraza alleged that Cuevas had agreed to se ll 
property to Barraza and then breached the general terms of their agreement by fi li ng a quiet 
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title action against Barraza, an act contrary to the agreement to sel l the property. Thus, where 
the breach of contract that Barraza relied on did not arise from Cuevas' failure to perform a 
specific act under the contract, the court mentioned that the claim accrued "when Barraza 
became aware of the breach." Id. But the court went on to clarify that "[t]he breach alleged in 
Barraza's answer occurred when Cuevas filed the instant quiet title action," not when Barraza 
"became aware" of the breach." Id. (emphasis added). The court's comment that the statute 
of limitations began to run "when Barraza became aware of the breach" is mere dicta, not a 
change in well-established Id aho law that the claim accrues "upon breach ." Id. While the 
discovery rule does apply to the accrua l of certain other claims,4 the discovery rule does not 
apply to claims for breach of a written contract. 
The City also relies on dicta from Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763 (1995), to suggest that 
the City's claim for breach of contract did not accrue until HK provided notice to the City. The 
City's argument is not supported by Idaho law. In reality, the nature of the breach of contract 
in Spence is the same as in Cuevas. Specifically, the Spences alleged that Howell was merely 
holding certain property for the Spences and was supposed to deed it back to them at some 
unknown future date, but once they learned that Howell had started logging the property and 
had listed it for sale, the Spences claimed that Howell had breached the contract. Id. at 721. 
The Spences did not allege a breach of any express term of their agreement with Howell, but on 
Howell's actions inconsistent with the general terms of their agreement. The dicta from Spence 
do not create a new requirement under Idaho law that a breaching party notify the non-
breaching party for the cause of action to accrue. 
4 See I.C. §§ 5-218 (actions for fraud), 5-219 (actions for med ical ma lpractice), 5-237 (actions against directors or 
stockholders of a corporat ion), 5-241 (actions for latent construction defects), 
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The undisputed facts of this case show that the City's claims for breach of contract 
accrued on March 2, 2010, the day after the March 1, 2010 deadline for HK to convey the 
property to the City. As of March 2, t he City could have sued HK for breach of the Agreement. 
Contrary to the City's argument, Idaho law does not calculate the statute of limitations on the 
City's breach of contract claims from the date the City "discovered" that HK had breached the 
Agreement, and it does not calculate the statute of limitations from the time that HK "notified" 
the City that it had breached the Agreement. The City's claim accrued "upon the breach," 
wh ich is the date that the City could have maintained a lawsuit against HK. That the City owns 
over 140 different parcels of property does not excuse its failure to pursue its breach of 
contract claims within f ive years of their accrual. 
11. THE FIVE-YEAR LIMITATION PERIOD IN IDAHO CODE SECTION 5-216 APPLIES TO THE 
CITY'S CLAIMS AS ONLY THE STATE ITSELF IS EXEMPT FROM THE LIMITATION PERIOD. 
The City recites that the five year limitation period in Idaho Code Section 5-216 "shall 
never apply to actions in the name or for the benefit of the state and shall never be asserted 
nor interposed as a defense to any action in the name or for the benefit of the state ... " 
(emphasis added). The City then quotes from various other statutes and constitutional 
provisions that expressly refer to cities and municipalities as "political subdivisions" or "other 
subdivisions of t he state" 5 to persuade this court to read that same language into Section 5-
216, even though no such express language exists. 
The City's argument proves too much. By providing numerous examples where the 
legislature expressly refers to " the state" and "other political subdivisions thereof," the City 
5 See pp. 6-8 of the Brie f in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss dated December 28, 2016, al ready on file 
with the court. 
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similarly demonstrates that the legislature is both aware of and able to include the more 
expan sive reference to the state and its subd iv isions when the legis lature deems appropriate. 
These examples of the legislature express ly expanding the definition of "the state" stand in 
stark contrast to Section 5-216's reference to "the state" alone. The City asks this court to read 
Section 5-216 to include language that is just not t here. 
In fact, the legislature's ability to de lineate between statutes that narrowly app ly only to 
the state and those that more broad ly apply to the state and its po litical subdivisions is even 
demonstrated within the same chapter as Section 5-216. Just t wo sections later, Sect ion 5-218 
twice refers specifical ly to "the state of Idaho or any political subdivision thereof." Later in the 
chapter, Section 5-247 expressly defines "government un it" to include "[a] pol itical subdivision 
of the state, including a municipality ... " Not only does the legislature draw a distinction 
between the state alone and the state with its polit ical subdivisions within the Id aho Code 
genera lly, but expressly draws this distinction within the same chapter as Section 5-216. 
The City's re liance on Bannock County v. Bell, 8 Idaho 1, 65 P. 710 (1901), and Blaine 
County v. Butte County, 45 Idaho 193 (1927), are also misplaced . The Supreme Court of Idaho's 
opinion in Bannock County in 1927 interpreting "state" to include counties and cities predates 
the 1939 amendment creating the state's exe mption in Section 5-216. Thus again we see the 
legislature had t he opportunity to define the exemption in Section 5-216 to include more than 
just the state, but chose to limit the exem pt ion to the st ate alone and not its political 
subdivisions. Then in bot h Bannock County and Blaine County, the Court interpreted Section 5-
225 t o expa nd the limitat ion periods in Tit le 2, Chapter 5, to apply to the state of Id aho and its 
po liti cal subdivis ion s. These cases, which expand the application of the limitation periods 
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beyond the state to include its political subdivisions, lend no support to the City's argument to 
expand the exemption from the limitation period in Section 5-216. Although Section 5-216 
and 5-225 include similar references to "the state," their respective purposes are entirely 
opposed. To interpret their respective references to "the state" differently honors the different 
purposes of the two statutes. To interpret their references to "the state" in the same way 
undermines their opposing purposes, i.e., to apply the limitation periods more broadly (Section 
5-225) and to exempt the state from one single limitation period (Section 5-216). 
Final ly, without any citation to any authority, the City argues that the exemption from 
the limitations period in Section 5-216 should apply here because the City's action is an action 
"for the benefit of the state." The City fa ils to exp lain how its action is brought "for the benefit 
of the state," but opines that enforcement of the Agreement wou ld benefit "the people and the 
government of the State of ldaho." 6 The City provides no authority to suggest a benefit to the 
residents of the City of Idaho Falls is equal to a benefit to the State of Idaho. In fact, the City's 
liberal interpretation of this exemption to the statute of limitations runs directly contrary to the 
Supreme Court of Idaho's directive that statutes of limitations are "to be liberally construed" 
whi le exemptions to the statutes of limitations "are to be strictly construed and will not be 
extended by implication." Mendini v. Milner, 47 Idaho 439, 276 P. 313, 314 (1929) (citations 
omitted). If the court were to construe any benefit to residents as a "benefit to the state" for 
purposes of avoiding the statute of limitations, then the exception would swal low the rule as all 
po litical subdivisions could claim some indirect "benefit to the state" by benefitting some 
resident within its stewardship even though the statute is expressly limited to the state itself. 
6 See p. 11 of the Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss dated December 28, 2016, already on file 
with the court. 
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The City provides no case app lying the exemption found in Section 5-216 to include 
cities in the manner the City urges here. Again, the legislature and the courts could have 
included poli tical subdivisions in the exemption set forth in Section 5-216 as they have in other 
sections, but they have not. Instead, the legislature and courts have limited th e exemption to 
the statute of limitations in Section 5-216 to the state of Idaho itself. 
111. THE CITY'S CLAIM TO HK'S PROPERTY ARISES FROM A CONTRACT, NOT A HIGH 
CONSTITUTIONAL PUBLIC DUTY. 
Next, the City argues that this court should not app ly the statute of limitations to bar its 
claims by ana logizing its contract rights from the Agreement with t he "high constitutional public 
duty" discussed in State v. Peterson, 61 Idaho 50 (1939). However, the "high constitutiona l 
public duty" discussed in Peterson is not present in the instant case. The City cannot trace its 
right to land for stormwater drainage back to the Idaho Constitution. Rather, the City's claims 
arise so lely from contract . The City provides no constitutiona l basis for its claim. The 
constitutional obligation to hand le public school funds as a trustee found in Peterson is not 
found here. The Peterson court's exemption from the statute of limitations rested on a 
combination of (1) the state of Idaho being the highest sovere ign in the state, and (2) a duty 
deriving from the Idaho Constitution itself, the most "sacred" source of duty. Under these 
limited circumstances, the Peterson court did not bar the claim. The City can make no similar 
comparison here . The City is one of the lowest sovereigns in the state, and the City has no 
express const itutional duty to provide stormwater drainage. The City's contractual right is not 
coequa l with the State of Idaho's const itutiona l and fiduciary duty to admin ister public school 
funds. 
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IV. PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS APPLYING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS DIRECTED BY THE 
APPLICABLE STATUTES. 
The City offers a number of public policy arguments suggesting there is some inherent 
unfairness in holding the City accountable for its failure to timely file its claims. However, the 
City knew of its express contract rights, had the information and means to enforce those rights, 
and simply waited longer than the law allows to enforce those ri ghts . HK did not mislead the 
City, did not conceal facts from the City, and did not falsely reassure the City in any way. The 
City signed the same Agreement that HK did, a document that both identifies the requ ired 
performance and the specific date for that performance. The City can claim no surprise. 
HK's performance was not " left to the determination of one party alone"7 as the City 
asserts. HK's obl igation was not like a promissory note payable on demand. Rather, the parties 
agreed in writing to performance by a date certain, i.e., no later than March 1, 2010. Just 
because the City did not seek to enforce its rights within the five year limitation period does not 
mean that HK did not act in good faith or took unfair advantage of the City. 
The City cries fou l, "especially where the City performed all of its obligations under the 
contract."8 However, the plain language of the Agreement demonstrates that the City had no 
obligations to perform under the Agreement. Rather, HK provided value to the City by way of 
the storm drainage easement and the pending property transfer, while the City gave essentially 
nothing in return . On its face, the Agreement evidences HK's goodwill attempt to ben efit the 
City at no cost to the City. For the City to now t ry to spin the pla in language of the Agreement 
to imply some ill-intentions on HK's part is disingenuous. 
7 Seep. 14 of the Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss dated December 28, 2016, already on file 
with the court . 
8 Seep. 15 of the Brief in Opposition to Defendant' s Motion to Dismiss dated December 28, 2016, already on file 
with the court . 
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HK is not t aking unfair advantage of the City, but allow ing the City to pursue its claim at 
this late date could take unfair advantage of HK. In reliance on the City's delay in asserting its 
contract ri ghts, HK has invest ed substantial additional sums of mon ey in making the property 
productive. To allow the City t o not only claim the property, but t o claim the proceeds derived 
from the property earned at HK's expense would result in an unfair advantage to the City. 
As for the City's determination to become more aggress ive or litigious, that is up to the 
City. For this court to apply Section 5-216 to bar the Cit y's untimely contract claims w ill not 
require the City to fil e more lawsuits. It may serve as a reminder that the City cannot sleep on 
its rights, but it w ill not necessarily require more lawsuits. Th e City's residents would certa inly 
not object to the City being more v igilant in prot ecting the City's interest s. 
The competing public policies governing when and if a city's claim should be barred by 
the statute of limitations have already been considered, debated, and addressed over the 
course of decades by the Idaho legislature. The legislature has struck a balance between 
holding cities accountable to the sa me st andard as the rest of th e publi c, while recognizing 
certain situations w here the government's high public duty demands an exception to t he rule. 
The City's present situation simply does not rise to the level necessary to justify an exception 
from the requirement that it assert its contract claims within five years. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
For the reasons set forth herein and in HK's moving brief, the court should grant HK's 
motion to dismiss the Complaint. 
II 
II 
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DATED this ___5_ day of January, 2017. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
By~~ <~ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3 day of January, 2017 I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS to be served by 
placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, or by hand delivery, facsimile transmission, or overnight delivery, addressed to the 
following: 
[ ] J.Y.5. Mail 
[~ Facsim ile Transmission 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box 
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Randall D. Fife 
Michael A. Kirkham 
City of Idaho Falls 
375 D Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401 
F:\CLIENTS\BJD\9109 - HK Contractors, lnc\Pleadings\004.Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss.docx 
69
1 - , 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS, an Idaho 
Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
V , 
H-K CO TRACTORS, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation 
Defendants. 
Case o. CV-2016-6339 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER O DEFENDANT' S MOTION 
TO DISMISS. 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant H-K Contractor's Motion to Dismiss for 
fai lure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) IRCP. 
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
As evident from the pleadings, on September 23, 2005, Defendant, H-K Contractors (H~ 
K), and Plaintiff the City ofldaho Falls (the City), entered into a written agreement which 
required H-K to convey to the City title to a particular parcel ofland. 1 
The agreem nt left the time of conveyance to the discretion of H-K as H-K was still 
using the land at th time of the agreement. However, the Agreement stated that "in no event" 
would the conveyance occur "later than March 1 2010." H-K nev r conveyed the parcel to the 
l Wh ile H.K.'s motion might ha e better been styled as a motion for judgment on the pleadings (Rule 12(c)) both 
Partie hav addressed the motion recognizing that the facts set out in the complaint are accurate and that the motion 
turns on the law appl icable to those facts . Thus, while the City's breach of contract claim states a valid cause of 
action, the Court will address whether tbe cause of action hould neverthe less be dismissed ba ed on the pleadings. 
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City. On March 9, 2016, the City sent a letter to H-K requesting conveyance of title. H-K 
responded in a letter dated June 16, 2016 in which it refused to convey title and claimed that 
sometime in 2009, a City official (Recreation Director, David Christensen) had orally informed 
H-K that the City was no longer interested in the parcel (apart from H-K's letter, there is no 
evidence of this verbal notice in the record). Based on that aJleged representation, H-K decided 
to invest in the prope1ty to make it profitable, and now refuses to convey title to the City. 
The City fi led its Complaint on November 22, 2016, alleging claims for Breach of 
Contract and Waste. H-K now moves this Court to dismiss the action, alleging the City's claims 
are time-barred pursuant to LC. § 5-216. The City defends its claim, alleging that: 1) there is an 
issue of material fact as to when Defendant breached the contract, triggering the running of the 
statute of limitations; 2) § 5-216's statute of limitations does not apply to the City as political 
subdivision of the State; 3) Statutes of Limitations that interfere with the City's constitutional 
and trustee duties to the public do not apply to the City; and 4) there are substantial public policy 
reasons not to apply any statute of limitations in this case. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
"A 12(b)(6) motion [to dismiss] looks only at the pleadings to determine whether a claim 
for relief has been stated." Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102. 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 
(2002). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss "will not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt 
that the appellant could prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to 
relief." Orthman v. Idaho Power Co. , 126 Idaho 960,962,895 P.2d 561 ,563 (1995) (citations 
omitted). Unless an exception appl ies, a plaintiff can have no claim for relief if the statute of 
limitations applicable to that claim has run, and dismissal of the action is proper. Baker v. St. 
Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr.. o. 42519, 2015 WL 4401 518, at *3 (Idaho Ct. App. July 20, 2015). 
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In a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the moving party admits all the allegations of 
the opposing party's pleadings. State v. Yzaguirre , 144 Idaho 471 , 474, 163 P.3d 1183, 1186 
(2007). Summary judgment or dismissal is improper unless the law precludes the claim 
notwithstanding the admitted allegations. 
III. ANALYSIS 
The primary issues before the Court are: I) When did the breach of contract occur?; and 
2) If the breach occurred more than five years before the Ci ty filed its claim, is the City 
exempted from the five-year statute of limitations of LC. § 5-2 16? 
A. Accrual of the Breach of Contract Claim. 
The City alleges that the breach of contract did not occur until June 16, 2016, when H-K 
fust notified the City in writing of its intention to keep the property. H-K argues that the alleged 
breach would have occurred no later than March 1, 20 I 0, when title was not transferred. 
The law as it pertains to the issue of when a breach of contract occurs so as to trigger the 
statute of limitations is clear. The statute of limitations does not begin to rw1 until a claim 
accrues upon the breach of the contract. Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 770, 890 P.2d 714, 
721 ( 1995). The question of when breach occurred is a factual one. Id. Courts must look to the 
record for sufficient and competent evidence of when the breach occurred. Id. The breach occurs 
when a reasonably prudent person would have discovered the breach. Id. 
Here, H-K argues that any breach would have occurred when H-K failed to convey title 
by March L 20 10. The City, however, alleges that Spence v. Howell requires notice of breach 
before the statute of limitations will run, and that it (the City) did not receive such notice of H-
K's breach until June 16, 2016, when H-K, in writing, refused to convey the property to the City. 
The City, however, misinterprets Spence v. Howell. In that case, the parties entered into oral 
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agreement which specified no specific date of performance, but rather a negative covenant 
stating the defendant would not use the land fo r a particular purpose. The court concluded that 
the statute of limitations began to run when the plaintiffs became aware, or had reason to be 
made aware, of the breach. It further concluded that the plaintiff could only have become aware 
of the breach when they discovered the defendant was using the land in violation of the 
covenant. 
The present case is easily distinguishable from Spence v. Howell. The parties, here, have 
a written contract expressly requiring H-K to convey title on or before March 1, 2010. As a party 
to the contract in this matter, the City ought to have been aware of its terms. A reasonably 
prudent person in the City's position would have discovered the breach on March, 1, 2010, or the 
day after, when H-K failed to convey title. The fact that H-K did not express, in writing, its 
intention to breach until June 16, 2016, is irrelevant to the accrual of the claim. Rather, the claim 
accrued, and the statute of limitations began to run as of March 1, 2010, when the deadline for 
transferring title passed. 
B. The Statute of Limitations. 
As the City did not file suit until November 22, 2016, the five-year statute of limitations 
in LC. § 5-216 applies in this case and bars the City' s claims unless the City can show that it is 
somehow exempted from the application of § 5-216. The City claims to be exempted on three 
grounds: (1) § 5-216's statute of limitations does not apply to the City as political subdivision of 
the State; (2) statutes of limitations that interfere with the City's constitutional and trustee duties 
to the public do not apply to the City; and (3) public policy advises against the application of the 
limitation to the present facts. 
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The City argues that as a subdivision of the State of Idaho, it is expressly exempted by 
the language of § 5-21 6, which reads, "The limitations prescribed by this section shall never 
apply to actions in the name or for the benefit of the state and shall never be asserted nor 
interposed as a defense to any action in the name or for the benefit of the state .. . " This argument 
hinges upon whether the legislature intended the word "state" to include cities. 
In support of its argument, the City notes that the Idaho Constitution, m multiple 
instances, expressly identifies cities as subdivisions of the State. (See Idaho Const. Art. Vlll § 
2(4); Idaho Const. Art. VIII§ 3; and Idaho Const. Art. VIII § 4). The City also notes that several 
provisions of the Idaho Code include language suggesting that the term "State" includes political 
subdivision, such as municipalities. However, the legislature has also been careful to specifically 
identify the state and political subdivisions in certain legislation. Such a provision is found in the 
very same Chapter as§ 5-216. Section 5-218 provides as follows: 
The cause of action in favor of the state of Idaho or any political subdivision thereof, 
upon a smety bond or undertaking provided for or required by statute shall not be deemed 
to have accrued against any surety on such bond or undertaking until the discovery by the 
state of Idaho or any political subdivision thereof of the facts constituting the liability. 
[ emphasis added] 
Idaho Code § 5-247 similarly states: "In this section, "governmental unit" means: (a) A 
political subdivision of the state, including a municipality or county; and (b) Any other agency of 
government whose authority is derived from the laws or constitution of this state." The statute at 
issue here, LC. § 5-216, does not include such language. However, the City would have the 
Court read into § 5-2 16 such language based on the fact that some sections of the Idaho 
Constitution and the Idaho Code have included it. 
The City also points out that the predecessor to I.C. § 5-225, which includes nearly 
identical "state" language to § 5-2 16, has been interpreted by the Idaho Supreme Court to apply 
to counties, towns, and cities of the state. (See Bannock Cty. v. Bell, 8 Idaho 1, 65 P. 710, 712 
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(1901); Blaine Cty. v. Butte Cty., 45 Idaho 193, 261 P. 338, 339 (1927)). The City urges the 
Court to likewise interpret § 5-216 in order to create harmony between the two sections. This 
requires the Court to look to canons of statutory construction. 
Idaho laws governing statutory interpretation provide that: " . .. Where a statute is clear 
and w1ambiguous, the expressed intent of the legislature shall be given effect without engaging 
in statutory construction. The literal words of a statute are the best guide to determining 
legislative intent." I.C. § 73-11 3. "Only where the language is ambiguous will this Court look to 
rules of construction for guidance and consider the reasonableness of proposed interpretations." 
Stonebrook Const., LLC v. Chase Home Fin. , LLC, 152 Idaho 927, 930, 277 P.3d 374, 377 
(2012)(quoting Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 398, 224 P.3d 458, 465 
(2008)). "[A] statute ' is ambiguous where reasonable minds might differ or be uncertain as to its 
meaning."' In re Adoption of Doe, 156 Idaho 345, 349- 50, 326 P.3d 347. 35 1- 52 (2014). 
However, where the question is whether the legislature inadvertently left language out of the 
statute, the missing language is not to be read into the statute by the courts. Saint Alphonsus 
Reg'! Med. Ctr. v. Gooding Cly., 159 Idaho 84, 89, 356 P.3d 377, 382 (20 15). The Supreme 
Court recently stated: 
... this Court has been reluctant to second-guess the wisdom of a statute and has been 
W1willing to insert words into a statute that the Court believes the legislature left out, be it 
intentionally or inadvertently. See Boise Street Car Co. v. Ada Cnty., 50 Idaho 304, 296 
P. 1019 (1931) (declining to read the words "and less than five thousand poW1ds," that 
were claimed to have been inadvertently omjtted from a provision fixing license fees for 
motor vehicles "weiglu ng more than two thousand pounds"); see also Manary v. 
Anderson, 176 Wash.2d 342, 292 P.3d 96, 103 (2013) ("Where the legislature omits 
language from a statute, intentionally or inadvertently, the Supreme Court will not read 
into the statute the language that it believes was omitted."); Estate of Bell v. 
Commissioner, 928 F.2d 90 1, 904 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Congress is presumed to act 
intentionally and purposely when it includes language in one section but omits it in 
another."). Indeed, as thi s Cowt stated in Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 177, 369 P.2d 
1010, 101 3 (1962), "[t]he wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute are 
questions fo r the legislature alone." 
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Id. 
The Court recognizes that in certain code sections and constitutional provisions the word 
"state" could include all political subdivisions. However, it is clear that other references to the 
"state" do not include political subdivisions such as cities. For example, the "state" under the 
Idaho Administrative Procedures Act does not apply political subdivisions. In re City of Shelley, 
151 Idaho 289,292, 255 P.3d 1175, 1178 (201 1 ): "Counties and city governments are considered 
local governing bodies rather than agencies for purposes of the IDAP A." 
The language of § 5-216 is not ambiguous on its face. The language only includes an 
express exemption for the state. Therefore, the Court is not permitted to look to extrinsic 
evidence of legislative intent regarding its meaning (including case law interpreting similar 
language in other sections of the Idaho Code). What is more, the Supreme Court has given clear 
instruction that when language is included in one section but left out in another section, the 
Courts are to assume the legislature had a purpose for do ing so, and to leave any redrafting of the 
statute to the legislature. For these reasons, the Court concludes that the reference to the "state" 
in § 5-2 16 applies on! y to the State of Idaho, and not to political subdivisions like the City of 
Idaho Falls. 
The City also argues that § 5-216 does not bar the claim because, by its express language, 
the limitation does not apply to actions filed for the "benefit of the state". The City claims that by 
judicially seeking to enforce its contract with H-K, it is attempting to obtain a parcel of land, 
which it plans to hold for some public use in the future. It further argues that it cannot hold such 
property without authority from the State. Caesar v. State, 101 Idaho 158, 160 (1980); Sanches v. 
City of Caldwell. 135 Idaho 465, 468 (2001). The City's argument continues that because its 
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contract with H-K was designed to benefit the citizens of Idaho Fall s, it, by extension, would 
also benefit the State of Idaho, as Idaho Falls citizens are also citizens of the State. 
Again, the City's argument would add language to the statute where no such language 
exists. It is evident from the Idaho Code that the legislature has repeatedly recognized a 
distinction between the state and state agencies and political subdivisions. Had the legislature 
intended to broaden the application of the exemption to all political subdivisions, it could easily 
have done so. The City' s argument is an attempt to circumvent the plain language of the statute, 
which exempts only the "state" from the statute of limitations. Indeed, such a circumvention 
would result in any entity or person, in any capacity, avoiding the statute of limitations simply 
because it can trace a benefit of its claim to some resident of the state. 
As H-K points out, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated: "[t]he statute of limitations .is 
general, is to be liberally construed, and must be applied in all cases where an exception is not 
specifically made. Statutes creating exemptions are to be strictly construed and will not be 
extended by implication". Mendini v. Milner, 47 Idaho 439, 276 P. 313, 314 (1 929), (cited with 
approval in Peterson v. Gentilfon, 154 Idaho 184, 189,296 P.3d 390, 395 (2013)). 
The legislature has. for whatever reason, chosen not to include political subdivisions in 
the exemption language of §5-216, though it has done so in similar sections. It is not within the 
Court' s purview to constructively redraft the statute or extend its exemption to the City by 
implication. 
Based on the foregoing, the exemption provision of§ 5-216 does not apply to the City of 
Idaho Falls. 
Next, the City points to the common law, argu ing that § 5-216 does not apply because the 
City was acting under its constitutional duty and authority to hold property. in trust, for the 
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benefit of the public. When the government holds property in trust for the benefit of the public, 
a statute of limitations, which if applied would result in the benefit of that trust transferring from 
the public to a private individual, is rendered inapplicable. State v. Peterson, 61 Idaho 50, 97 
P.2d 603, 605 (1939). This rule arose over a mortgage dispute between the State of Idaho and 
two of its citizens. Id. The state loaned the couple money out of the State 's public school 
endowment fund to purchase their home. Id. The couple defaulted, and the State brought a 
foreclosure action against the couple. but not before the applicable statute of limitations had run. 
Id. The Court found that by barring the State's action, the statute of limitations would, in 
essence. operate to transfer public property, which had been entrusted to the State. to private 
individuals. Id. To prevent that outcome, the Court refused to apply the limitation. Id. 
Here, however, there is no such transfer of public prope1ty to a private individual. The 
City did not lend public money or property to H-K. In fact, the contract between the parties 
called for H-K' s conveyance of it's own private prope1ty to the City. There is no evidence that 
the City transferred anyth ing, public property or otherwise, to H-K. In this case, if the City is 
barred by the statute of limitations, H-K simply retains private property which it already owned, 
not public property the City holds in trust. Therefore, the City was not acting under duty or 
authority of a trustee of public property, and § 5-216 cannot be avoided on such grounds. 
Finally, the City argues that applying to statute of limitations in this case is contrary to 
public pol icy. Central to its argument is the premise that applying the statute of limitations in this 
case would allow H-K to avo id its contractual obligations. The City claims that Idaho, as a 
matter of public policy, does not permit a party to avoid his contractual obligations when the 
timing of his perfo1mance is left solely to hjs discretion. The City asserts that because H-K was 
permitted to convey the title in its discretion at any time, the determination of performance was 
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left entirely in the hands of H-K, that H-K quietly breached the contract in deception of the 
City's expectations and without the City's knowledge. The facts, however, do not support the 
argument. H-K was not free to perform at "any time" under the contract. The contract required 
H-K to convey title by March 1, 2010. No matter how "quietly" H-K breached, a prudent person 
in the City's position should have noticed (if not immediately, then ce1tainly within five years) 
that H-K did not convey title by March 1, 2010. It may be true that in certain scenarios, public 
policy would preclude a party from avoiding its contractual obligations. However, it is also long-
held Idaho public policy to prevent a party who "sleeps on his rights" from avoiding the 
application a statute of limitations. Davis v. Consol. Wagon & Mach. Co., 43 Idaho 730, 254 P. 
523, 524 (1927). Because the City had reason to know of H-K's breach long before the statute of 
lin1itations had run, the Court finds no reason to refrain from applying § 5-216 to the City under 
these facts. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing the Court finds that the 5 year statute of limitations of§ 5-216 is 
applicable to the City's claim and bars this action. H-K's Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this _jJ_ day of January, 2017. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS. an Idaho 
Municipal Corporation, 
Case No. CV-2016-6339 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation 
Defendants. 
Judgment is entered as follows: 
The complaint in this matter is dismissed with prejudice. 
Dated this _j_j_ day of January, 2017. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS an Idaho 
Municipal Corporation, 
Case No. CV-2016-6339 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation 
Defendants. 
Judgment is entered as follows: 
The complaint in this matter is dismissed with prejudice. 
Dated this fl day of January, 2017. 
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Randall D. Fife/I SB # 4010 
Michael A. Kirkham/ISB #8939 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS 2017 FEB 16 P 1 3: 18 
375 D. Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83401 
Telephone: (208) 612-8178 
Facsimile: (208) 612-8175 
Attorney for City of Idaho Falls, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS, an Idaho ) 
municipal corporation, ) Case No. CV-2016-6339 
) 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., an Idaho ) Filing Fee: L4 $129.00 
Corporation, ) 
) 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
) 
- --- ----------
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., AND 
THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY OF RECORD, B.J. DRISCOLL, AND THE CLERK 
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLE COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, City of Idaho Falls, appeals against the above 
named Respondent, H-K Contractors, Inc., to the Idaho Supreme Court from the 
following Decision and Order entered in the above-referenced action, the 
Honorable Joel E. Tingey presiding: Judgment and Memorandum Decision and 
Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss dated 17 January, 2017. 
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2. Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Judgment 
described in paragraph 1 is appealable under and pursua nt to Idaho Appellate 
Rule ll(a)(l). 
3. Appellant provides the following preliminary statement on appeal, which 
Appellant intends to assert in the appeal. This preliminary statement, however, 
provides only preliminary issues and shall in no way prevent Appellant from 
asserting other issues on appeal. The preliminary issues on appeal are: 
A. Did the District Court err in granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss? 
B. Did the District Court err in holding that the term "state" in Idaho Code 
§ 5-116 does not include governmental subdivisions of the State of Idaho, 
such as municipal corporations? 
1. Appellant requests the reporter's standard transcript in electronic format. 
5. Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's Record, 
in addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rule 28: 
A. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, dated 19 December 2016. 
B. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, dated 19 December 2016. 
C. Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, dated 28 December, 
2016. 
D. Defendant's Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, 
dated 3 J anuary 2017. 
6. No additional charts or pictures offered or admitted are requested in this appeal. 
7. I certify: 
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A. that a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the court reporter, 
Jack Fuller, at the address set forth in the certificate of service attached; 
and 
B. that the clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee of $200 
for preparation of the reporter's transcript, subject to adjustment on 
receipt from the clerk's office of an estimate of cost; and 
C. that the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record of $100 has been 
paid, subject to adjustment on receipt from the clerk's office of an estimate 
of cost; and 
D. that the appellate filling fee has been paid; and 
E. that service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
DATED thi/6(/t day of February, 2017. 
Michael A. Kirkham 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appellant 
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Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that on this~ day of February, 2017, I served a true 
and correct copy of the forgoing document on the following by the method of delivery 
indicated: 
B.J. Driscoll 
Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Jack Fuller, Court Reporter 
Bonneville Country Courthouse 
605 N. Capital Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Notice of Appeal 
oU.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
oDesignated courthouse box 
oHand-delivered 
)(Fax: 208-529-4166 
oU.S. Mail, :g t _e re aid 
esignated courthouse 
~ and-delivered 
oFax: 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS, an Idaho 
Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
V . 
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation 
Defendants. 
Judgment is entered as follows: 
Case No. CV-2016-6339 
JUDGMENT OF COSTS 
Defendant is awarded costs as against Plaintiff in the amount of $1 36 with interest 
accruing thereon at the statutor rate . 
Dated this E_ day of February, 2017. 
Jo~~ev~ 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ;}.,:) day of February, 2017, the foregoing document was entered 
and a true and correct copy was served upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered to their courthouse boxes. 
B.J. Driscoll 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & AS SOCIA TES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 €J... °I- 41 &~ 
Randall D. Fife 
Michael A. Kirkham 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS 
375 D Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401 /.p /),_- g /7~ 
Penny Manning 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
by '::m,4/ 
Deputy Clerk 
JUDGMENT-2 
89
t7 FEB 23 All Sl 
I THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
CI Y OF IDAHO FALLS, an Idaho 
Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
H-K CO TRACTORS, INC. , an Idaho 
Corporation 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2016-6339 
ORDER 
This matter has come before the Court upon Defendant's motion for an award of costs 
and attom fees a against Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not objected to the motion. 
Inasmuch as Defendant prevailed on his motion for summary judgment the Court finds 
that Defendant is th prevailing party in this matter. Based upon Defendant's memorandum of 
costs, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to an award of costs in the amount of $136. The 
Court declines to award discretionary costs. 
Attorn y Fees 
Defendant seeks attorney fees pursuant to I. C. § 12-117 and 12-121. ection 12-117 
provid s that in a proceeding where a political subdivision is an adverse party, the court may 
award reasonable attorney's fe s "if it find that the nonprevailing party acted without a 
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reasonable basis in fact or law." Similarly,§ 12-121, read in conjunction with Rule 54(e)(2), 
IRCP allows for an award of attorney fees when the court "finds that the case was brought, 
pursued or defended fri volously, unreasonably or without foundation . .. " 
While the Court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment. the Court cannot 
conclude that Plaintiff s cla im was unreasonable, frivolous, or without fow1dation. On the 
contrary, the Comt consider the issue to be a "close call" with authority supporting the positions 
of each Party. Accordingly, the Court finds that attorney fees are not awardable under the 
foregoing statutes. 
Based on the record and the foregoing, Defendant shall be awarded costs in the amount of 
$136. Defendant's request for attorney fees is denied. 
Dated this _ii_ day of February, 2017. 
~~?n 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this J..::> day of February, 2017, the foregoing document was entered 
and a true and correct copy was served upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered to their courthouse boxes. 
B.J. Driscoll 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Randall D. Fife 
Michael A. Kirkham 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS 
375 D Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401 
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IN 'Ilil!, DrSl'lUCT COl'RT OF TKE: SEVENill ,TTJDIClAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAJI0, C'I AND FOR THE COl;NTY OF BO. ~EVlUE 
CITY OF [DAHO FALLS, ""Idaho 
Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
H-K co:-.1RACTORS, n<C., an Idaho 
Colpol:3don 
Defend!IJlts. 
Case No. CV-.1016-6339 
OF.DER 
This w&tter has come before the Court upon D,;fendant' s motion fOI an award of costS 
and attorney fees as agcin~t Plaintiff. l'Jah:ro'.ffhas nor obj'ecl.ed to tlie motion. 
lrutsm,u.ch as Defendant prei:ai!ed on his motiop for Sll.ll'll1lf.rY judg:men1, the Court finds 
th,~t Defem.lant is Che _prevailing l)Ut)' ic cl:!.is matter. Based upou Def:udam's memorandum of 
costs, the Couc1 :fipds lhal Defrndsnlk •ntitled to !In ov.'ardof c.,9111;,, t:he amount of SI 36. The 
Court declines to av.:e:rd dfg~ticn.al)' costs. 
Actom.ey Fees 
Defundant seeks attorney fees purnumt to LC. §§ 12-1 l 7 nnd 12-1 21. Section 12-1 17 
prCJVides thal in a proceeding wh= a pol!tlG.ll subdivi;ion is an adverse JlafiY. the court m:,.y 
nwmd =on5ble m-torney's fees •'lf lt find.s that 11).e noll!lrevallh!g party acted without a 
Oll.D6a-l 
Date and Time Dest ination 
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0°00'41" FAX 
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OK 
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Randall D. Fife/ISB # 4010 
Michael A. Kirkham/ISB #8939 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS 
375 D. Sti·eet 
Idaho Falls, ID 83401 
Telephone: (208) 612-8178 
Facsimile: (208) 612-8175 
Attorney for City of Idaho Falls, Idaho 
. r 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS an Idaho ) 
municipal corporation, ) Ca e No. CV-2016-6339 
) 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, ) 
) 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
) 
------------- - -
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., AND 
THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY OF RECORD, B.J. DRISCOLL, AND THE CLERK 
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLE COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, City of Idaho Falls, appeals against the above 
named Respondent, H-K Contractors Inc. , to the Idaho Suprnme Com-t from the 
following Decision and Order entered in the above-referenced action, the 
Honorable Joel E. Tingey presiding: Judgment and Memorandum Decision and 
Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismis dated 17 J anuary, 2017. 
Amended Notice of Appeal Page 1 of 4 
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2. Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Judgment 
described in paragraph 1 is appealable under and pur uant to Idaho Appellate 
Rule ll(a)(l). 
3. Appellant provides the following preliminary statement on appeal, which 
Appellant intends to assert in the appeal. This preliminary statement, however, 
provides only preliminary issue and shall in no way prevent Appellant from 
as erting other issues on appeal. The preliminary issues on appeal are: 
A. Did the District Court err in granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss? 
B. Did the District Court err in holding that the term "state" in Idaho Code 
§ 5-116 does not include governmental subdivisions of the State of Idaho, 
such as municipal corporations? 
4. Appellant requests th e reporter's transcript for J anuary 4, 2017, Hearing result 
for Motion, estimated pages under 100. 
5. Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's Record, 
in addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rule 28: 
A. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, dated 19 December 2016. 
B. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, dated 19 December 2016. 
C. Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, dated 28 December, 
2016. 
D. Defendants Reply B1·ief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismi, s, 
dated 3 January 2017. 
6. No additional charts or pictu.Te offered or admitted are requested in this appeal. 
Amended Notice of Appeal Page 2 of 4 
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7. I certify: 
A. that a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the court reporter, 
Jack Fuller, at the address set forth in the certificate of service attached; 
and 
B. that the clerk of the District Corn-t has been paid the estimated fee of $200 
for preparation of the reporter's transcript, subject to adjustment on 
receipt from the clerk's office of an estimate of cost; and 
C. that the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record of $100 has been 
paid, subject to adjustment on receipt from the clerk's office of an estimate 
of cost; and 
D. that the appellate filling fee has been paid; and 
E. that service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
DATED this20_ day of March, 2017. 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS 
Michael A. Kirkham 
Attorney for Plaintifil Appellant 
Amended Notice of Appeal Page 3 of 4 
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Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that on this 7-0 day of March, 2017, I served a true and 
correct copy of the forgoing document on the following by the method of delivery 
indicated: 
B.J. Driscoll 
Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Jack Fuller , Court Reporter 
Bonneville Country Courthouse 
605 N. Capital Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Amended Notice of Appeal 
oU.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
oDesignated courthouse box 
oHand-deli vered 
p:Fax: 208-529-4166 
oU .S. Mail, postage prepaid 
~esignated courthouse box 
oHand-delivered 
oFax: 
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RECEIVE: 
Randall D. Fife/ISB # 4010 
Michael A. Kirkham/ISB #8939 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS 
376 D. Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83401 
Telephone: (208) 612-8178 
Facsimile: (208) 612-8175 
Attorney for City of Idaho Falls, Idaho 
2017HAR 20 P~i 3: 48 
IST K1C i COU RT 
M •4• c.,~.; rn :, TE nrv 1s10 N 
f.JOHNEYIL F C'."' tm · y 
I (1 • ( I ' 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS, an Idaho ) 
municipal corporation, ) Supreme Court Docket No. 44886-2017 
) 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) Bonneville County District Court 
) No. CV-2016-6339 
vs. ) 
) SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF 
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., an Idaho ) APPEAL 
Corporation, ) 
) 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
---------- - - - - ) 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., AND 
THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY OF RECORD, B.J. DRISCOLL, AND THE CLERK 
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLE COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, City of Idaho Falls, appeals against the above 
named Respondent, H-K Contractors, Inc., to the Idaho Supreme Com't from the 
following Decision and Order entered in the above-1·eferenced action, the 
Honorn.ble Joel E. Tingey presiding: Judgment and Memorandum Decision and 
Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss dated 17 January, 2017. 
Second Amended Notice of Appeal Page 1 of 4 
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RECEIVE: 
2. Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Judgment 
described in paragraph 1 is appealable under and pursuant to Idaho Appellate 
Rule ll(a)(l). 
3. Appellant provides the following preliminary statement on appeal, which 
Appellant intends to assert in the appeal. This preliminary statement, however, 
provides only preliminary issues and shall in no way prevent Appellant from 
asserting other issues on appeal. The preliminary issues on appeal are: 
A. Did the District Court err in g1.'anting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss? 
B. Did the District Court err in holding that the term "state" in Idaho Code 
§ 6-116 does not include governmental subdivisions of the State of Idaho, 
such as municipal corporations? 
4. Appellant requests the reporter's transcript for Janua1y 4, 2017, Hearing result 
for Motion, estimated pages under 100, in an electronic version. 
5. Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's Record, 
in addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rule 28: 
A. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, dated 19 December 2016. 
B. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, dated 19 December 2016. 
C. Brief in Opposition to Defendant's ]\!lotion to Dismiss, dated 28 December, 
2016. 
D. Defendant's Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, 
dated 3 January 2017. 
6. No additional charts or pictures offered or admitted are requested in this appeal. 
Second Amended Notice of Appeal Page 2 of 4 
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7. I certify: 
A. that a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the court reporter, 
Jack Fuller, at the address set forth in the certificate of service attached; 
and 
B. that the clerk of the District Comt has been paid the estimated fee of $200 
for preparation of the reporter's transcript, subject to adjustn1ent on 
receipt from the clerk's office of an estimate of cost; and 
C. that the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record of $100 has been 
paid, subject to adjustment on receipt from the clerk's office of an estimate 
of cost; and 
D. that the appellate filling· fee has been paid; and 
E. that service has been made upon all parties required to be servedpmsuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
DATED this '66 day of March, 2017. 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS 
Michael A. Kirkham 
Attorney for Plaintiffi!Appellant 
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RECEIVE: 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that on this ~ 0 day of March, 2017, I served a true and 
correct copy of the for g·oing· document on the followmg by the method of delivery 
indicated: 
B.J. Driscoll 
Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P .O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
J ack Fuller , Court Reporter 
Bonneville Country Courthouse 
605 N. Capital Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Second Amended Notice of Appeal 
o U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
oDesignated courthouse box 
oHand-delivered 
jef'ax: 208-529-4166 
oU.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
~esignated courthouse box 
oHand-delivered 
oFax: 
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Jack L. Fuller, CSR 
Official Court Reporter 
Seventh Judicial District 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N Capital Ave 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
(208) 529-1350 Ext. 1138 
E- Mail: jfuller@co.bonneville . id.us 
***************************************************************** 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
***************************************************************** 
DATE: March 22 , 2017 
TO : Stephen W. Kenyon , Clerk of the Court 
Supreme Court/ Court of Appeals 
P . O. Box 83720 
Boise , ID 83720-0101 
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO: 44886 - 2017 
DISTRICT COURT CASE NO: CV-2016-6339 
CAPTION OF CASE: City of Idaho Falls , an Idaho municipal 
Corporation vs . H- K Contractors , Inc ., an Idaho Corporat i on 
You are hereby notified that a reporter ' s appellate 
electronic transcript in t he above - entitled and numbered case has 
been l odged with the Appeals Clerk of the Count y of Bonneville in 
the Seventh Judicial District . Said transcript consists of the 
fol l ow i ng proceedings , totaling 25 pages : 
1 . Hearing on Defendant ' s Motion to Dismiss (January 4 , 
2017) 
cc : Appeals Clerk 
Respectful l y , 
~x~ 
JA~. FULLER 
I daho CSR #762 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS, an Idaho 
Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
V. 
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
________ ____ _ __ ) 
ST ATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
County of Bonneville ) 
Case No. CV-2016-6339 
Docket No. 44886 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATION 
OF EXHIBITS 
I, Penny Manning, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the foregoing Exhibits were 
marked for identification and offered in evidence, admitted, and used and considered by the 
Court in its determination: 
No exhibits were offered or admitted. 
And I further certify that all of said Exhibits are on file in my office and are part of this 
record on Appeal in this cause, and are hereby transmitted to the Supreme Court. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
District Court this l 3 day of June, 2017. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATION OF EXHIBITS- I 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS, an Idaho 
Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
V. 
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________ _ ) 
ST A TE OF IDAHO 
County of Bonneville 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2016-6339 
Docket No. 44886 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Penny Manning, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, 
correct and complete Record of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required under 
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause, will 
be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript 
(if requested) and the Clerk's Record as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand affixed the seal of the District 
Court this _L2_ day of June, 2017. 
CLERK'S CERTJFICA TE - 1 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS, an Idaho 
Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
V. 
H-K CONTRACTORS, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
___ ________ _ ___ ) 
Case No. CV-2016-6339 
Docket No. 44886 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the h'3..,__ day of June, 2017, I served a copy of the 
Reporter's Transcript (if requested) and the Clerk's Record in the Appeal to the Supreme Court in 
the above entitled cause upon the following attorneys: 
Michael A. Kirkham 
P.O. Box 50220 
Idaho Falls ID 83405 
B.J. Driscoll 
PO Box 50731 
Idaho Falls ID 83405 
by depositing a copy of each thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope 
addressed to said attorneys at the foregoing address, which is the last address of said attorneys 
known to me. 
CLERK'S CERTlFJCATE OF SERVJCE - I 
